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This dissertation contains three chapters that study risky debt pricing. The first
chapter studies defaultable consumer debt in general equilibrium. The second and third
chapters study corporate debt in partial equilibrium. Below are the individual abstracts for
each chapter.
Chapter 1: What Drives the Consumer Credit Spread? An Explanation Based on Rare
Event Risk and Belief Dispersion.
What drives consumers borrowing/lending and the credit spread over their debt?
This paper offers a novel explanation based on rare event risk and belief dispersion in a
dynamic general equilibrium model. Heterogeneous beliefs drive consumers to borrow, but
the market is incomplete and subject to rare event risk and thus default endogenously occurs
in equilibrium. The paper derives the credit spread in closed form and yields a credit
spread similar to real data when the model is calibrated. The model also well captures the
relationship between belief dispersion, risk-free rate and credit spread. It shows that belief
dispersion, rare event risk and wealth distribution together drive both credit spread and risk-
free rate. An increase in either rare event risk or belief dispersion leads to a higher credit
spread and a lower risk-free rate. However, the underlying mechanisms are quite different, as
the former (rare event risk) is due to substitution effect while the latter (belief dispersion) is
due to wealth effect. The paper also makes a contribution to the literature on rare disaster
by endogenizing default and augments Barro’s argument on the countervailing effects of rare
disasters on interest rates.
Chapter 2: Scooping Up Own Debt On the Cheap: The Effect Of Corporate Bonds Buy-
ii
back on Firm’s Credit Condition
The paper constructs a structural model to study the effect of corporate bonds buyback
on the firm’s credit conditions. The model implies that the firm strategically choose how
much debt to buy back and the buyback reduces the firm’s probability of default. In contrast
to commonly perceived deleverage channel, the model highlights a novel channel that buying
back bonds on the cheap transfers value from bondholders to equity holders and incentivizes
the equity holders to choose a much lower assets value to declare default. The lowered
default boundary furthermore reduces debt overhang and increases return to equity. The
virtuous cycle does not stop until the marginal benefit of bonds buyback equals its marginal
cost. The model also implies that when bonds market liquidity dries up, the firm should
buy back more bonds, as the shortage of liquidity is independent of the firm’s fundamental
but depresses the market price of bonds. The paper also provides empirical evidences for
the implications.
Chapter 3: How to roll over debt? The Effect of Risky Bond Yield Curve on Optimal
Rollover Strategy
This chapter studies how firms can exploit the risky bond yield curve (treasury yield
curve plus term structure of credit spread) to manage the maturity profile of new debt
issuance. In contrast to existing literature, I shut down the rollover frequency channel, but
highlight the clean effect of the maturity profile of new debt issuance on firm’s credit risk
and value. A better rollover strategy takes into account of the curvature, level as well as
the sensitivity (market depth) of the risky bond yield curve. The model implies that the
firms should disperse maturity dates of new debt issuance when the risky bond yield curve
iii
is concave; they also should trade off the level against the sensitivity of the risky bond yield
curve when issuing new debt. The consequent rollover strategy assuages both adverse assets
shocks and liquidity shocks better. The model derives multiple testable implications and
accentuate the endogenous interaction between rollover strategy and risky bond yield curve.
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Chapter 1
What Drives the Consumer Credit
Spread? An Explanation Based on
Rare Event Risk and Belief Dispersion
1.1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed rapid increase in consumer debt. In fact, the total out-
standing consumer debt is significantly more than corporate debt (see Figure 1.1). Given
the economical importance of consumer debt as a macroeconomic variable, it is critical to
understand the cost of consumer borrowing and the economic factors that drive it.
Compared to the vast literature on corporate bonds credit spread, the research on con-
sumer credit spread is thin. Corporate and consumer credit spread share many similarities,
but they do differ and one cannot simply transplant the theory of corporate bonds credit
spread to households and consumers. For example, although corporate and consumer credit
spread is mostly positive correlated, the correlation is far less than perfect. Table 1.1 shows
the correlation coefficients between different measures of consumer credit spread and cor-
porate bonds credit spread. Furthermore, from the perspective of economic theory, while
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capital structure is deemed as the major determinant of corporate bonds credit spread, a
theory of consumer credit spread (price) is supposed to take into account household con-
sumption/saving decision (quantity), portfolio choices and risk aversion.
In this paper, we build up a dynamic general equilibrium model to explain the factors that
drive the consumer credit spread qualitatively and quantitatively. We model the consumer
as an agent who makes decisions on consumption and portfolio choices. The model features
two types of agents with heterogeneous beliefs (the optimist vs. the pessimist) and rare
event (jump) risk in an incomplete market. The heterogeneous beliefs cause the agents to
trade endogenously while the rare event risk, which occurs infrequently but drastically affects
consumption, generates significant credit spread. The securities space is not complete to fully
hedge the rare event risk, leaving room for default to happen in the equilibrium. We calibrate
our model to match the data on lending risk premium, the difference between prime rate 1
and treasury bill rate. The lending risk premium is a key component of borrowing cost for
all consumers and compensates the systematic risk, which accurately interprets the credit
spread in our model. Table 1.2 summarizes the lending risk premium and the delinquency
rate of consumers who can borrow at the prime rate. To our knowledge, our paper is the
first asset pricing model that studies as well as quantifies safe debt and risky household debt
and their prices in general equilibrium. In particular, our model features the relationship
between systematic risk and risky household debt.
1 The prime rate, is a “reference or base rate” that banks use to set the price or interest rate on many
of their commercial loans and some of their consumer loan products ( See What is the prime rate, and
does the Federal Reserve set the prime rate? Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, https:
//www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/credit_12846.htm). It is also the rate that banks charge the customer
with the highest credit ratings for short-term credit (Booth (1994)).
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Since the market in the paper is incomplete, there is no guarantee that equilibrium exists.
Hence, some discussions regarding the existence of the equilibrium are necessary meanwhile
assets prices are derived in equilibrium, if any. We first start with a simple example to
illustrate the main idea of the paper, considering a typical problem in the portfolio choice
literature. An infinite-horizon representative agent has logarithmic utility and tries to max-
imize the expected utility by choosing consumption and adjusting investment portfolios.
There are two assets in the market: risk-free debt and risky asset, e.g. stock and/or housing,
that subjects to jump risk. The example shows that the agent’s position on risky asset is
highly constrained by the potential jump size. Given the potential jump size is sufficiently
large, even if such a jump only realizes with a tiny probability, the agent is reluctant to
take any leverage ! The partial equilibrium simple example poses difficulty in risk sharing
when the market only features risk-free debt and risky asset which subjects to rare event
risk. The problem lies in the fact that a risk-free debt contract is too much to ask under
such circumstance. With the intuition, we formally show that the same holds in general
equilibrium: there is no such interest rate that clears the risk-free debt market.
In this sense, the defaultable bonds endogenously emerge in the market and therefore we
introduce defaultable debt securities in the model with one being against large downward
jump and the other one being against positive jump. When belief dispersion is mild, the
defaultable bond against downward jump can restore the competitive equilibrium. In the
equilibrium, the optimistic agents will issue risky bonds to finance the long position in risky
asset. The optimist’s position in risky asset and the downward jump size that just triggers
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default are closely related and will be jointly determined in equilibrium. If a substantial
downward jump occurs out of a sudden, the optimists will default and part of the risky debt
are written down. As a consequence, the pessimists, who are the buyers of the risky bonds,
will suffer a loss and therefore require a risk premium ex-ante.
However, when belief dispersion is large, the defaultable bond against upward jump is
also indispensable to establish equilibrium. The upward jump echoes “rare boom” in Tsai
and Wachter (2015b). When disagreement between agents is significant, the optimists would
perceive the total return to risky asset is much higher than the financing cost of leverage
and thus would like to take an aggressive leverage position. Nevertheless, the supply of risky
asset is finite (normalized to “1”) and hence the pessimists need to short sell some shares
to “create” the supply. Yet, given the possibility of large positive jump, the pessimists will
opt out of short-selling without the defaultable bonds against upward jump. When short
selling, the pessimists need to issue risky bonds to cover the short position. In the case that
an upward jump realizes, the pessimists will deliver the short shares and default on the risky
bonds. We quantify the upper bound of the belief dispersion above which the equilibrium
fails to exist without the risky bonds against positive jump. By doing so, the model also
provides a framework to evaluate to what extent regulations on short selling limits risk
sharing among agents.
The model is built on time-varying belief dispersion and rare event risk (Gabaix (2012),
Wachter (2013)). The agents are able to learn from various sources and update their beliefs
about the unknown parameters but are subject to behavioral bias (Scheinkman and Xiong
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(2003), Pastor and Veronesi (2009)), resulting in time-varying belief dispersion. By assuming
the jump size follows a generalized logistic distribution, this paper manages to achieve credit
spread in closed-form. Finally, the calibrated model yields a time series of household credit
spread, belief dispersion and risk-free rate comparable to real data.
One main contribution of the model is that it generates a correlation between credit
spread, belief dispersion as well as risk-free rate similar to what is observed in the data. Our
model implies that asset prices, including credit spread and risk-free rate, are driven by belief
dispersion, rare event risk as well as the relative wealth between the two types of agents. To
better understand the relationship between asset prices and the three fundamental economic
variables, we run regression of credit spread as well as risk-free rate on belief dispersion, rare
event risk and the relative wealth ratio. The regression indicates that both greater belief
dispersion and rare event risk tend to increase the credit spread and lower the risk-free rate.
However, the underlying mechanism is quite different. When the rare event risk increases, it
is more likely for the rare event to occur and trigger the default on defaultable bonds. The
risky bonds holders thus would require a higher premium compensation for the increased
risk. Therefore, it is more costly for the optimist to leverage up and consequently they
re-balance their portfolios toward more risk-free bonds holding, pushing down the return on
the risk-free bonds. In essence, the increased rare event risk accentuates the substitution
between risky asset and risk-free bonds.
On the other hand, if belief dispersion between the agents gets wider, the optimist would
regard the cost of leverage is cheaper with respect to the return on risky asset and there-
5
fore would like to borrow more via issuing more defaultable bonds. This translates into
a higher default risk and higher credit spread; However, given more resources at disposal
from borrowing and wider belief dispersion, there is also a “wealth effect”: the optimist
not only purchases more shares of risky asset, but also more risk-free bonds to optimize his
portfolios. The increased demand on safe bonds would also push down the risk-free rate.
This insight is novel and different from other similar models in the early literature, which
typically features risky asset and risk-free bonds in a complete market. In those models,
risky asset and risk-free debt are always substitutes in the sense that increasing risky asset
holdings decreases risk-free bonds holdings given wealth, as the agent has no other financing
vehicle. In contrast, the optimist in our model invests in both risky asset and risk-free bonds
by borrowing via risky bonds; the pessimist, on the other hand, would mainly invest in risky
bonds and risk-free bonds instead of risky asset.
The relationship between corporate bonds credit spread, risk-free rate and belief disper-
sion have been empirically documented extensively in the literature. For example, Buraschi,
Trojani, and Vedolin (2013) found that the belief dispersion has a time-varying systematic
counter-cyclical component and peaks near the Great Recessions. Güntay and Hackbarth
(2010) reached a same conclusion on disagreement and credit spread, showing the forecast
dispersion can explain about 23% of the cross sectional variation in credit spreads; Albagli,
Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2014) developed a nonlinear and noisy rational expectation equilib-
rium model and found that the belief dispersion can explain 16% to 42% and 35% to 46%
of the observed credit spread over 4-year and 10-year investment grade bonds, respectively
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; Buraschi and Whelan (2013) found that short rate is negatively related to disagreement;
Xiong and Yan (2010) found that the belief dispersion between agents can explain the term
structure of risk-free rate; Among others, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001),
Duffee (1998), Morris et al. (1998) found that credit spread is inversely related to risk-free
rate. Apparently, the three variables are underlyingly related. However, none of the studies
accounts for them at the same time. Our study not only empirically documents the relation-
ship between the consumer debt credit spread, risk-free rate and belief dispersion but also
provides a novel explanation based on rare event risk and heterogeneous beliefs in a single
model.
This paper has several other contributions. One important theoretical contribution of the
paper is to endogenize default in the rare event risk model. Earlier research on rare event
risk 2 takes an ad hoc approach in modeling default, assuming that default occurs with an
exogenous probability during disaster time and some fraction of the gross return on debt is
wiped out. As noted in Tsai and Wachter (2015a),
“In this case, the assumption of complete markets still implies that there exists a risk-free
rate; it just is not comparable to the government bill rate. What happens if markets are
incomplete and there is no risk-free rate? This is a hard question to answer because the
representative investor framework no longer applies, and we are not aware of any work that
addresses it ”
2 Related work on rare event risk includes Rietz (1988), Liu, Pan, and Wang (2005), Gourio (2008), Farhi
et al. (2009), Santa-Clara and Yan (2010), Gabaix (2011), Backus, Chernov, and Martin (2011), Barro and
Jin (2011) , Gourio (2012), Julliard and Ghosh (2012), Nakamura et al. (2013), Seo and Wachter (2013),
Kelly and Jiang (2014) and Farhi and Gabaix (2016) among others.
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In this paper, we precisely address the problem. Default on debt occurs endogenously in
equilibrium. The probability of default as well as exposure at default is time-varying and
strongly correlated with rare-event risk and belief dispersion. Endogenizing default is im-
portant in that it allows to analyze the channel through which the default on debt occurs.
For example, although the effects of rare event risk and belief dispersion on credit spread
and risk-free rate are similar, the underlying channels are quite different. Moreover, by en-
dogenizing default, we are able to elaborate on Barro’s argument on the effect of rare event
risk on the interest rate. Barro (2006) argues that on one hand, an increase in likelihood
of a disaster would lower the agent’s expectation and decrease interest rate; On the other
hand, the probability of default due to disaster also rises and hence increases the interest
rate. The net effect is ambiguous. In the current paper, we show that both effects exist but
they affect different interest rates on different bonds.
Closest to the current paper is Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012). They employed a consumption-
based asset pricing model and focused on the effect of disagreement on the likelihood and
severity of rare disasters between agents on the disaster risk premium and risk sharing. Our
paper differs from theirs in several ways. First, while they focused on the disagreement on
the likelihood and severity of rare disasters, we emphasize the belief dispersion on the ex-
pected growth rate; Second, while they discussed extensively the effect of disagreement and
rare disasters on the stock market, we concentrate on the riskless and risky debt market.
Last, but certainly not least, they extended Bates (2008) and introduced a continuum of
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contingent claims for the agents to fully hedge the disaster risk3 whereas in our model, the
agents can only trade two risky debt securities in addition to stock and safe debt, leaving
the market incomplete and making default on debt in equilibrium possible.
Chatterjee et al. (2007b) studied unsecured consumer loans and default in a general equi-
librium model based on Imrohoroğlu (1989), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). They
assumed that households smooth consumption by means of a riskless asset and unsecured
loans and linked the household idiosyncratic risk, e.g. large medical bills, to consumer debt
default. In contrast, our model features the role of financial assets such as stock/housing,
risk-free and defaultable debt, and highlights the link between systematic risk (or aggregate
shock) and consumer debt default. Therefore, our model can be regarded as complimentary
to Chatterjee et al. (2007b).
This paper also provides a framework to evaluate the welfare effect of debt default. In a
partial equilibrium model, Zame (1993) argues that default can help to improve welfare in
an incomplete market. Whether the conclusion would still remain in general equilibrium is
not clear. Our model provides a clear-cut answer to the question. The defaultable bonds
facilitate risk sharing and trading between agents, helps to complete the securities space in
an incomplete market and can thus increase welfare. In particular, we show that without
defaultable bonds, there would be no trading in an economy where the agents are exposed
to rare event risk. Recently, Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014) provides a general
3 Alternatively, Jones (1984) shows that if an underlying asset’s jump size has a finite state distribution,
a sufficient number of different contingent claims written on this asset can help to fully hedge jump risk and
complete the market.
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welfare criterion for models with distorted beliefs. Our paper, jointly with theirs, can lay a
groundwork for discussion of optimal defaultable securities design.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 1.2, we start with one simple
example to illustrate the main idea of the paper. In Section 1.3, we introduce the model,
present equilibrium asset prices and discuss the model implications, and Section 1.4 con-
cludes. All proofs are provided in the appendix.
1.2 One Simple Example
To illustrate the main idea of this paper, we first consider a typical portfolio choice problem
when the risky asset is subject to jump risk. The example shows the necessity of risky bonds
in an economy featuring rare event risk. It also sheds light on how we introduce endogenous
default and generate credit spread in a classical consumption-based asset pricing model.
Agents
An infinite-horizon representative agent is endowed with initial wealth W0, has time pref-
erence ρ and derives utility from logarithmic consumption.
Assets Market
10
There are two types of securities in the market: stock4 and risk-free debt. The stock price
St follows a jump-diffusion process given by
dS
S
= µdt+ σdzt + kdNt (1.1)
where {zt} is a standard Brownian motion, {Nt} is a Poisson process with constant intensity
λ. k for now is considered to be constant. To avoid the trivial case of jump-to-ruin, we
assume k > −1.




In the partial equilibrium simple example here, r is assumed to be constant.
Now we can formulate the portfolio choice problem. An agent chooses portfolio weight























is the consumption wealth ratio.
The problem is well studied in the portfolio choice literature, for example, Aı̈t-Sahalia,
Cacho-Diaz, and Hurd (2009) and Jin and Zhang (2012). Proposition 1 characterizes the
4 Throughout the paper, we follow the convention in the literature and interpret the risky asset as stock.
However, similar to Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007), it can also be interpreted as housing service. In
section 1.3.7.1, we will explicitly reconcile our model with 2008 housing crisis and demonstrate that our
model can capture the dynamics of key macroeconomic variables pre and post crisis.
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solution to Problem 1.
Proposition 1.
c = ρ
optimal θ solves the following (quadratic) equation
− σ2kθ2 +
(
(µ− r)k − σ2
)
θ + µ− r + λk = 0 (1.4)
(1.4) has two solutions, one is greater than − 1
k
and the other one is less than − 1
k
.
Proof. See Appendix (1.5.1)
If k is positive, the representative agent would choose the θ greater than − 1
k
; if k is
negative, he would choose the one less than − 1
k
. Both cases imply that the agent fully
incorporates the jump risk in the portfolio choice and the risk sharing is limited by the




= [θtµ+ (1− θt)r − ct] dt+ θtσ dzt + θtk dNt (1.5)
Given k is negative, if the agent’s leverage is too high, i.e. θt ≥ − 1k , his marginal utility
becomes too low (−∞) upon arrival of Poisson jump; The same happens when k is positive
and the agent’s short selling strategy is too aggressive, i.e. θt ≤ − 1k . In either case, the




This poses difficulty in risk sharing and trading when the agents in the economy are,
for example, heterogeneous in beliefs and have motive to trade. To see this, let λ → 0
and k → −1. λ → 0 means that in most of the time, the jump risk does not realize and
trading is expected to occur in the market between agents holding different beliefs: the more
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optimistic ones would like to borrow from the pessimistic ones to purchase risky assets and
the incentive would be stronger when the interest rate is low; However, k → −1 implies that
θ ≤ 1 and the trading is highly restricted by the very rarely realized risk. It also raises the
question regarding the existence of the equilibrium, as market clearing condition asks for the
agents to hold all the outstanding shares.
Not only the predicament arises when the jump amplitude k is a constant, it also happens
when k follows a distribution, for example, on (−1,∞). The problem lies in the fact that
a safe bond without other financial instruments (in addition to stock) is too much to ask
in such an economy. In Section 1.3, we introduce defaultable debt securities as well as safe
bond and stock for agents holding heterogeneous beliefs to trade, and derive assets prices in
equilibrium. Meanwhile, to motivate the launch of defaultable debt securities, we also show




In this section, we lay out the basic set-up for the model.
1.3.1.1 Aggregate Endowment
The model is a version of Lucas Jr (1978) with an exogenous endowment. Time is continuous.










dt+ σdzEt + (e
Y − 1) dNt (1.6)
or equivalently,



















where µt is the time-varying expected growth rate of the aggregate endowment. σ is
the constant volatility. zEt is a standard Brownian motion with z
E
0 = 0 and Nt is a Poisson
process with intensity λt. k := e
Y − 1 is the stochastic jump amplitude. We will elaborate
λt, k := e
Y − 1 and µt in details below.
Jump intensity λt follows a CIR-type stochastic process





with unconditional mean λ̄ and stationary variance
λ̄σ2λ
2αλ
. αλ is the mean-reversion parameter,
σλ is the volatility parameter, z
λ
t is a standard Brownian motion independent of z
E
t . We
impose a standard technical condition 2αλλ̄ ≥ σ2λ to prelude λt ever being zero.
Jump amplitude k := eY − 1 represents the instantaneous drop or boom in aggregate
endowment upon arrival of the rare event. Yi are independent and identically distributed ran-
dom variables and follow a generalized logistic distribution on the real line with probability






, y ∈ (−∞,∞) (1.9)
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where B is the Beta function5.
One might wonder that the standard logistic distribution seems to be a more natural
choice 6. However, E(eY ) does not exist when Y follows a standard logistic distribution,
implying a heavy tail. The generalized logistic distribution has a thinner tail compared to
the standard one and , as shown in Section 1.3.4, provides closed-form characterization of
equilibrium credit spread compared to normal distribution (Backus, Chernov, and Martin
(2011)). Figure 1.2 compares standard normal, standard logistic and generalized logistic
distribution.
Time-varying expected growth rate of the aggregate endowment µt follows a
mean-reverting process whose dynamics is given by
dµt = αµ (µ̄− µt) dt+ σµ dzµt (1.10)
αµ, σµ are mean-reversion and volatility parameters, respectively. µ̄ is the unconditional
mean of µt and z
µ
t is a standard Brownian motion independent of {zEt , zλt }. µt is unknown to






, x ∈ (−∞,∞)
(Johnson and Samuel Kotz (1995)). As α increases, the tail becomes thinner. For E(eY ) to be well defined
as well as simplicity, we therefore choose α = 2.
6 Power law distribution is also commonly assumed for rare disaster (Barro and Jin (2011)) and rare
boom (Tsai and Wachter (2015b)). The problem with power law distribution is that it is not well defined at
zero, while we wish for a single continuous distribution for both disaster and room. Also, it becomes clear
later that the left tail (disaster) matters more than the right tail (boom) for the quantitative result and
our assumption is conservative about rare disaster. In particular, the average disaster size implied by the
distribution is ∫ 0
−∞
(eY − 1)pY (y) = −0.25,
similar to 23% in Barro and Ursúa (2008) based on the international data on large consumption declines.
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the agents but all other parameters are public information. However, the agents can learn
µt from (1.6) and (1.10). Nevertheless, as shown below, the agents display behavioral bias
during learning and thus generate time-varying belief dispersion endogenously.
1.3.1.2 Agents
Since µt is unknown , agents have to learn and make an inference about the true underlying
parameter µt. However, their learning could be influenced by behavioral bias such as over-
confidence, leading to heterogeneity in beliefs and trading between different agents (Harrison
and Kreps (1978), Basak (2000), Basak (2005)). We follow Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
to model the learning process7. Specifically, we assume that there are two types of agents
in the market, A and B. They both have time preference ρ, derive utility from logarithmic







, i ∈ {A,B} (1.11)
Ei is the expectation with respect to the belief of each type of agents. Agents form their
beliefs from learning the information. In addition to the public information described in






dsAt = µt dt+ σs dz
A
t (1.12)
dsBt = µt dt+ σs dz
B
t (1.13)
7 Alternative learning process may also suffice as long as it introduces heterogeneity in beliefs, for example
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006)
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Without loss of generality, we assume {zEt , zAt , zBt , zλt , z
µ
t } are Brownian motions independent
of each other. Both types of agents know each other’s signals. Nevertheless, either type
exaggerates his own signal and displays overconfidence towards it when learning. In specific,
agent A perceives sAt as
dsAt = µt dt+ φσs dz
µ
t + (1− φ)σs dzAt (1.14)
meaning that agent A (falsely) believes the innovation of sAt is correlated with the innovation
of µt.
And the similar bias occurs to B, too. Agent B perceives sBt as
dsBt = µt dt+ φσs dz
µ
t + (1− φ)σs dzBt (1.15)
Note the two types of agents display symmetric behavioral biases. The behavioral biases
would generate time-varying belief dispersion and trading between the agents. And the
symmetry helps to keep the model dynamics stationary. In the early literature presenting
belief dispersion, the agent whose belief is relatively closer to the true underlying value will
dominate the wealth share in the long run and the other agent will be driven out of the
market, leading to non-stationary wealth dynamics (Kogan et al. (2006), Yan (2008), Kogan
et al. (2009) ). As neither of the agents has relative advantage over learning in our model,
we will see that the wealth ratio WA
WB
between the two agents fluctuates around 1.
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1.3.1.3 Learning and Inference
In this section, we discuss the learning and inference problem of the agents. As jump size Y

























d ln(Ẽt) = µt dt+ σ dz
E
t (1.17)
Note ln(Ẽt) is a diffusion process without jump. Thus, the learning problem falls into optimal
filtering problems that have been studied extensively in the literature (Liptser and Shiryaev
(2001)). The agent’s posterior distribution about µt conditional on all information It up to







, i ∈ {A,B} (1.18)
where IAt includes {(1.10), (1.13), (1.14), (1.17)} and IBt includes {(1.10), (1.12), (1.15), (1.17)}.
Since µt is a time-varying process, in general each type of agents will never learn the true
value perfectly, and thus there exists a steady state for vit, i ∈ {A,B}.
Similar to Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), we can derive the stationary variance v∗ and


























































The mean µ̃Bt of agent B follows an isomorphic process.
As we focus on µ̃At and µ̃
B
t , we shall assume that the agents start with stationary variance
v0 = v
∗. And to facilitate our discussion, we shall use “optimists” to describe the type of
agents with greater mean belief µ̃t and “pessimists” to describe the other type of agents.
Correspondingly, we let
µo = max{µ̃A, µ̃B} (1.21)
µp = min{µ̃A, µ̃B} (1.22)
Depending on the posterior belief µ̃At and µ̃
B
t , the roles of optimists and pessimists are not
fixed but could flip over time, i.e. sometimes A is the optimist while other times B is the
optimist. In the subsequent sections, we refer to the agents as optimists/pessimists instead
of A/B.
1.3.1.4 Assets Market Structure
Default would never occur in general equilibrium with complete market (Dubey, Geanako-
plos, and Shubik (2005)). With incomplete market, the structure of the assets market and
availability of financial instruments are critical in assets pricing and risk sharing between
agents. We consider four different kinds of financial securities: stock, safe debt and two
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different kinds of defaultable (risky) debt. We will elaborate why we need these securities in
Section 1.3.3.
Stock S is the claim to aggregate endowment. The total outstanding share of stock is
normalized to 1. Let S denote the price of stock, and given logarithmic utility functions, we
conjecture that it follows:
dSt
St−
= µs dt+ σs dzt + k
sdNt (1.23)
The superscript s means “stock”. The dividend-price ratio is E
S
. Therefore, the total return







The other three securities belong to the class of debt instruments.
Safe Debt Bf is an instantaneous risk-free zero-coupon bond. A borrower borrows Bft−








= rft− dt (1.25)
where rft− is the risk free interest rate written in the contract at t−. Note that since the bond
Bf is absolutely riskless, it does not allow any form of default. The bond can be regarded
as the “safe asset” in Barro and Mollerus (2014).
Defaultable Debt Bd is an instantaneous zero-coupon but risky bond, meaning a bond
issuer can default on the debt if he is not able to repay the principal or interest whenever
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there is a large downward jump. A bond issuer borrows Bdt− at t− and promises to repay




t− at t+ dt, if he does not default at t+ dt. Precisely,
dBdt
Bdt
= rdt− dt+ k
d
t dNt (1.26)
where rdt− is the interest rate of the risky bonds written in the contract at t− and kdt is the
writedown8 when default is triggered.
To complete the defaultable bond characterization, we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The default occurs when the issuer’s wealth (i.e. net worth ) drops no less
than |γ|,−1 < γ < 0.
The assumption 1 echoes Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995),
resembling the lenders “mark” default on borrowers who they think are not able to repay
the debt. In the language of consumer finance, γ can be regarded as the net worth shock
that triggers the consumer debt default.
Assumption 2. The writedown kd = k when default is triggered.
The assumption 2 says that the writedown co-moves with the market when debt defaults.
It is a legitimate assumption also adopted by Barro (2006). Since the default can only
possibly occur when the rare event Nt happens, a high writedown k
d reflects the difficulty
recovering bond value when the market plunges deep. This approach essentially models a
stochastic recovery of face value of the bonds, similar to Duffie and Singleton (1999).
8 It is implicitly assumed that debt default does not involve dead-weight cost that goes to a third party,
such as court or liquidator, i.e. the loss of the creditor is the gain of the debtor.
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0, if k > k̄
k, if k ≤ k̄
(1.27)
Occurrence of rare event does not necessarily trigger default; default happens only when
k = eY − 1 lower than a threshold k̄, i.e. the downward jump is sufficiently large. And it is
not hard to see that k̄ is closely related to the agent’s risky assets and leverage position.
Defaultable Debt Bd̃ is similar to the defaultable debt Bd and follows
dBd̃t
Bd̃t
= rd̃t− dt− kd̃t dNt (1.28)
and the default now is triggered when a sizable rare boom(i.e. positive jump) realizes in
the economy. Similar to Assumptions 1 and 2, we have the following ones with regard to
defaultable bond Bd̃
Assumption 3. The default occurs when the issuer’s wealth (i.e. net worth ) drops no less
than |ζ|,−1 < ζ < 0.
Assumption 4. The writedown kd̃ = k when default is triggered.
And we are looking for a “threshold equilibrium” in the following form
kd̃ =

0, if k < k̃
k, if k ≥ k̃
(1.29)
where k̃ is endogenously determined 9.
9 Given the positive jump ranges in (0,∞) in equation (1.9), the writedown can possibly be greater than
1. Therefore, the debt contract Bd̃ can also be interpreted as an (incomplete) insurance contract
22
In contrast to the early literature (for example, Merton (1973) and Cox, Ingersoll Jr, and
Ross (1985) among others), our model features two additional defaultable debt securities
Bd and Bd̃. As it becomes clear later, the optimists would finance his leverage position
by issuing defaultable bond Bd; the pessimists might need to issue defaultable bond Bd̃,
depending on whether he is engaged in short selling or not. They are both important to
establish the competitive equilibrium. We will discuss their roles in risk sharing in more
detail in Section 1.3.3.
1.3.2 The Problems of Agents
In this section, we will state the consumption and portfolio choice problem for the agents.
As the pessimist’s problem is similar to the optimist’s, I will mainly focus on analyzing the
optimist’s problem without loss of generality10. The optimist chooses consumption Co and
the portfolio weights {θo, θd,o, θd̃,o} on stock and defaultable debt securities respectively to










































are given by (1.23), (1.26), (1.28) and (1.25). θo, θd,o and θd̃,oare
optimist’s positions on stock and risky debt.
Definition 1 defines the competitive equilibrium we are about to characterize in Section
1.3.4.
10 The t subscript on the variables will be omitted when not essential for clarity
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Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is composed of {θo, θd,o, θd̃,o, θp, θd,p, θd̃,p, co, cp},
prices { rd, rd̃, rf , S} and debt contract variables {k̄, k̃} such that
1. Given prices { rd, rd̃, rf , S } and {k̄, k̃} , {θo, θd,o, θd̃,o, co} solve the optimist’s problem
2
2. Given prices { rd, rd̃, rf , S } and {k̄, k̃} , {θp, θd,p, θd̃,p, cp} solve the pessimist’s problem
similar to 2.
3. The optimists default when their net worth suddenly drops no less than 100|γ|%, i.e.
θoks ≤ γ or ks ≤ k̄; If default occurs, the writedown kd = k, otherwise kd = 0.
4. The pessimists default when their net worth suddenly drops no less than 100|ζ|%, i.e.
θpks ≤ ζ or ks ≥ k̃; If default occurs, the writedown kd̃ = k, otherwise kd̃ = 0.
5. Given {k̄, k̃}, all the markets clear, i.e.
(a) coW o + cpW p = E
(b) θoW o + θpW p = S
(c) θd,oW o + θd,pW p = 0
(d) θd̃,oW o + θd̃,pW p = 0
6. The optimists and pessimists are engaged in the non-cooperative, fully decentralized
bargaining with no cost and determine {k̄, k̃} in equilibrium.
It is worth of noting that (θo,k̄) are jointly determined in the equilibrium and so do (θp
, k̃). To see why, we will take the optimists as an example. On one hand, the optimists
have to declare default when the jump size ks ≤ γ
θo
and therefore k̄ ≥ γ
θo
. On the other
hand, given their position on risky asset θo, they do not prefer contract with k̄ > γ
θo
as the
contract allows them to borrow more than they actually need with a higher interest cost.
The defaultable debt markets will clear via non-cooperative, fully decentralized bargaining
with no cost. In equilibrium, the market determines the contract traded: the optimists
would like to pay rd and get a loan with default triggered at k̄; the pessimists would like to
receive rd and underwrite such a contract 11
11 Alternatively, similar to Geanakoplos (2010), Simsek (2013) and Walsh (2014), we can
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1.3.3 Assets Market Structure: Revisit
Before we characterize the competitive equilibrium in Section 1.3.4, we shall revisit the assets
market structure in Section 1.3.1.4. As aforementioned, in contrast to early literature, our
model features two additional defaultable debt securities in addition to standard stock asset
and safe debt. In this section, we highlight the importance of defaultable debt securities in
risk sharing and establishing equilibrium by addressing two questions.
The first question is why defaultable debt securities are needed. Suppose the market is
“safe-debt-only” instead, i.e. it only features stock and safe debt. Correspondingly, we can
modify Problem 2 by imposing θd,o = θd̃,o = 0 and equilibrium definition 1 by excluding
two defaultable debt securities. It turns out, as Proposition 2 shows, there is no equilibrium
in the “safe-debt-only” market. The equilibrium does not exist in the sense that no rf ∈
(−∞,∞) can bridge between the agents holding heterogeneous beliefs. The intuition behind
Proposition 2 is that “safe” debt security makes no room for trade. Note kt in (1.6) has
support on (−1,∞). The aggregate endowment has a risk of dropping to a positive yet
arbitrarily small amount. The stock price will fluctuate (or, co-move) with the aggregate
endowment. As a result, any nontrivial leverage position in the stock market (i.e. the






> 0), which is inadmissible in the log utility case. In this
introduce a continuum of defaultable debt contracts with different thresholds k̄ and k̃,
{{Bd(k̄), Bd̃(k̃)}|k̄ ∈ (−1, 0), k̃ ∈ (0,∞)}, and let the agents determine which contract to trade in
equilibrium. The new definition of the equilibrium needs to be modified to incorporate the market clearing
condition for each possible contract. However, it turns out that the equilibrium remains the same: in the
equilibrium the agents would trade only one debt contract. The intuition is that the agents always would
like to choose an optimal position on risky asset first and then pick a defaultable debt contract that is least
costly yet provides enough insurance against adverse rare events, given γ and ζ.
25
sense, defaultable bonds emerge endogenously in the economy and the optimists would issue
defaultable bonds Bd to finance his leveraged position.
Proposition 2. There is no equilibrium in the “safe-debt-only” market.
Proof. See Appendix (1.5.2)
The second question would be why two defaultable debt securities instead of one are
needed. Correspondingly, we can modify Problem 2 by imposing θd̃,o = 0 and equilibrium
definition 1 by excluding the defaultable debt security Bd̃. It turns out that the defaultable
bond Bd facilitates risk sharing only when belief dispersion is mild. When disagreement
between agents gets above some threshold, the optimist would think the borrowing cost rd
is very low, stock return µo is high and would like to take a significant leverage position.
However, the supply of the risky asset is finite (“1”) and hence short selling is needed to
“create” more supply. Notwithstanding, the economy (as well as the stock price) also subjects
to positive jump and thus short selling position would result in negative wealth when the
positive jump is realized. Therefore, the pessimists would like to issue the other defaultable
bonds Bd̃ to protect themselves from negative wealth. Should the stock price appreciate,
the pessimists would default on the risky bonds but fulfill the short position.





where Q (θo;ω, γ) is a continuous function on θo ∈ [1, 1 + 1
ω





Proof. See Appendix (1.5.3)
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1.3.4 Equilibrium
In this section, we establish and characterize the equilibrium in Definition 1. Again, as the
problems for the two types of agents are isomorphic, we focus on the optimists. We first
look at the First Order Conditions (FOCs) for Problem 2:
µo + ρ− λE[k]− rf − θoσ2 + λE
[
k
1 + θok + θd,okd + θd̃,okd̃
]
= 0 (1.32)
rd − rf + λE
[
kd
1 + θok + θd,okd + θd̃,okd̃
]
= 0 (1.33)
rd̃ − rf − λE
[
kd̃
1 + θok + θd,okd + θd̃,okd̃
]
= 0 (1.34)
co − ρ = 0 (1.35)
Given the class of defaultable bonds we are considering ((1.26), (3.48)) and ((1.28),(1.29)),
the first order conditions can be simplified as:




∣∣∣∣k̄ < k < k̃]P(k̄ < k < k̃) (1.36)










1 + (θo + θd,o) k
∣∣∣∣k ≤ k̄]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected L.G.D under risk-neutral probability
(1.37)

















is the marginal rate of substitution (kernel) conditional on that rare event occurs




have similar interpretations as pricing
kernels.
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Equation (1.37) and (1.38) show the credit spread on the different defaultable debt secu-
rities. However, they have the same economic interpretations that the credit spread is the
product of three components: the probability of a disaster occurring , the probability of the
disaster triggering default and the loss given default under risk-neutral probability.
Theorem 1 establishes the equilibrium result.
Theorem 1. The competitive equilibrium exists. The optimist’s position on stock is θo∗ which
is the solution to the equation µo−µp = Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) in (1,∞), where ω := W o
W p
is the relative
wealth share. The pessimist’s position on stock θp∗ = 1 + ω − ωθo∗. Safe Bonds Bf is in zero
supply. The credit spread on Bd is









The credit spread on Bd̃ is






where k̄ = γ
θo∗
and k̃ = ζ
θp∗
Proof. See Appendix (1.5.4)
In appendix, we show
Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) = 1θo∈(1, 1
ω
+1]Q (θ
o;ω, γ) + 1θo∈[ 1
ω
+1,∞)Q̃ (θ
o;ω, γ, ζ) (1.41)
Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) consists of two parts: 1θo∈(1, 1
ω
+1]Q (θ
o;ω, γ), when belief dispersion is mild




o;ω, γ, ζ), when belief dispersion is large, risky bonds for positive jump are
issued by short sellers to cover the position on stock. We separately plot Q (θo;ω, γ) and
Q̃ (θo;ω, γ, ζ) in Figure 1.3 (a) and 1.3 (b). Note that the upper bounds of Q (θo;ω, γ)
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are the starting points for Q̃ (θo;ω, γ, ζ), i.e. the two functions can be “glued” together
seamlessly, indicating Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) is a continuous function on θo ∈ (1,∞).
So, what happens when some rare event occurs ? Let’s take the downward jump and
risky bonds issued by the optimists as an example. When the rare event realizes at t+ and
the actual decline of the endowment kt+ is less severe than k̄t− written in contract at t−, the
default is not triggered. Under that circumstance, the optimist’s wealth changes by θokt+,
yet they are able to pay off the risky bonds in the amount of |θd,o|W o in addition to the
interest. In contrast, when kt+ ≤ k̄t−, the default is triggered. Their wealth changes by
θokt+, which could possibly have led to negative wealth. Nevertheless, the writedown terms
in the debt contract would exempt part of the debt repayment. In specific, the debt in the





W okt. In one word, when rare event and default happens, the change of the
aggregate wealth W o + W p is proportional to the total endowment E ; the risky bonds and
writedown terms alter the allocation between the two types of agents. In essence, the risky
bonds and the embedded writedown terms provide an insurance for the optimists to take
high leverage and protect them from non-positive net worth12. Meanwhile, the pessimists,
i.e. the buyer of the risky bonds, would like to buy as they earn the credit spread as a
premium.
12 Similar to Livshits, MacGee, and Tertilt (2007), in the context of our model, the debtor is able to
re-enter the market and trade upon default. As noted by Musto (1999), a household usually has difficulty
accessing credit market for a period of time post-bankruptcy filing of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13. Our model
can be modified to capture the feature by adding a period of “autarky”. The period of no trade essentially
increases the cost of default.
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1.3.5 Model Calibration
In this subsection, we follow several pieces of literature to calibrate the parameters used in
the model. Consistent with Brennan and Xia (2001), we set σ = 3.44%, σµ = 1.1%, αµ = 0.05
and µ̄ = 1.55%; we set time preference parameter ρ = 0.03, consistent with Barro (2006).
The value is also often used in the saving literature, such as Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes
(1995) ;Gabaix (2012) set λ̄ = 3.63%, which is based on Barro and Ursúa (2008). In a study of
time-varying disaster risk, Tsai and Wachter (2015b) set αλ = 0.11, σλ = 0.081; Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) set σµ
σs
= 2 in their numerical example, which leads us to σs = 0.55%
13. Using Measures of Forecast Dispersion for the Survey of Professional Forecasters from
Philadelphia Fed, we compute the annual mean and volatility of belief dispersion which are
1.23% and 0.71%, respectively. We calibrate φ = 9.7 to match the mean of belief dispersion,
which also gives us the volatility of belief dispersion of the same magnitude as the real
data; We set γ = ζ = −0.7, i.e. default is triggered when leveraged agents lose 70% of
their net worth, which is rather conservative. Admittedly, it is challenging to determine the
magnitude of the loss that triggers the leveraged household to default without micro-data.
We calibrate the parameter γ (or ζ) to match the average of correlation coefficients between
credit spread, risk-free rate and belief dispersion. Later, we will conduct comparative statics
to study the effect of γ (or ζ) on the credit spread. Table 1.3 summarizes the parameters
used in the baseline model.
13 The signal s can be interpreted as inflation rate, for example. Exclusive of Era of Stagnation from 1964
to 1985, the annual volatility of inflation expectation is 0.421%
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1.3.6 Model Result
The model generates belief dispersion, risk-free rate as well as credit spread compared to
real data. Table 1.4 14 shows the summary statistics of belief dispersion, credit spread and
risk-free rate from the model and data15. The model generates an average credit spread of
224.52 basis points (bps) with average probability of default around 0.59%, approximately
90% of the average credit spread 249.53 bps in the data. The model also generates a low
risk-free rate 0.57% and helps to explain the “ risk-free rate puzzle ”. Table 1.5 (a) and Table
1.5 (b) compare the correlation between credit spread, belief dispersion and risk-free rate
from the data and the model and justify our choice on γ = −70%. Of course, the magnitude
of the credit spread and risk-free rate generated by the model depends on γ, i.e. the net
worth shock that triggers default. In Section 1.3.7.2, we will look at the effect of γ on the
assets prices.
There are three fundamental variables that drive the entire economy: belief dispersion,
time-varying rare event risk intensity λt and the relative wealth ratio which essentially de-
termines whose belief the average belief of the economy will be toward. The three variables
affect the equilibrium risk-free rate and credit spread through agents’ trading in the market.
To see the effect of each individual variable on credit spread as well as risk-free rate, I run
regressions of credit spread and risk-free rate on the covariates using model-generated data
14 In the calibrated model, the credit spread is small on risky bonds Bd̃ that would default whenever there
is a large positive jump. Therefore, we only calculate the credit spread on risky bonds issued by the optimist,
i.e. the bonds which would default whenever there is a large downward jump.
15 We also considered a version of model with disaster risk intensity λ being constant and fixed at 3.63%.
The model simulated moments still well match the data except the volatility of the credit spread. Hence the
time-varying jump intensity is essential for the model to match the credit spread volatility.
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and the results are in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7.
Although both increase in rare event risk and belief dispersion raises credit spread and
pushes down risk-free rate, the underlying mechanism is quite different. To see this, in Table
1.8 we calculate the correlation between λ, µo − µp and the endogenous default threshold
k̄, i.e. the jump amplitude that just triggers the default given leverage. The correlations
have different signs, showing an increase in λ lowers k̄ while µo− µp behaves in the opposite
way. What are the underlying channels, respectively? From equation (1.39), an increase
in the rare event risk intensity (λt) would increase the credit spread ceteris paribus. As
a consequence, it is more costly for the optimist to leverage up and purchase risky assets.
Additionally, they have to re-balance their portfolios. Therefore, they reduce their position
on stock, pushing down k̄ (i.e. a downward jump of larger size to trigger default) and increase
the demand for risk-free bonds, causing the required return on the safe-bonds to fall. This
echoes the so-called “flight-to-quality” phenomenon. In essence, our model characterizes
risky asset and safe bonds as two investment substitutes. When rare event risk becomes
more likely, investors will substitute safe-bonds for risky asset.
On the contrary, Table 1.8 also shows that belief dispersion µo − µp and k̄ are positively
correlated. As belief dispersion gets wider, the optimist deems the required return on risky
bonds and the cost of leverage is cheaper and therefore would like to borrow more via issuing
more risky bonds. The higher leverage translates into a higher k̄ (i.e. a downward jump
of smaller size to trigger default) and pushes up the credit spread, as in (1.39). Yet, given
greater belief dispersion and more resources at disposal from borrowing, not only does the
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optimist purchase more shares of stock, he would also purchase more risk-free bonds to
optimize the portfolio, pushing down the required return on the risk-free bonds. This is the
“wealth effect”.
To clearly examine the “wealth effect”, we employ a numerical example to study compar-
ative statics of belief dispersion on assets holdings. We set set rf = 1.07%, rd = 3.57%, λ =
3.63%, γ = −70%, ω = 1.0. Without loss of generality, we focus on the assets holdings by
the optimist when the belief dispersion is mild, i.e. no short-selling in the market. Figure
1.4 (a) plots the portfolio weight on stocks θo, default boundary k̄ and belief dispersion.
Figure 1.4 (b) plots the relationship between belief dispersion and the demand for risk-free
asset 1− θo− θd,o. It is clearly shows that an increase in belief dispersion would push up the
leverage and the default boundary k̄, which leads to a higher demand for risk-free bonds,
too. As a consequence, in the equilibrium, the risk-free rate has to drop to clear the market.
This insight is utterly different from the similar models in the early literature. Those
models typically feature only stock and risk-free bonds in a complete market. By design,
they are always substitutes in the sense that increasing stock holdings requires decreasing
risk-free debt holdings (or becoming net borrowers) given wealth. Nevertheless, in our model,
the optimist invests in both stocks and risk-free bonds by borrowing via issuing risky bonds;
the pessimist would mainly invest in risky bonds and risk-free bonds instead of stock in the
sense that as the belief dispersion becomes greater, the pessimist starts to sell shares of stock
short instead of holding them.
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Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) has found that corporate bonds spread is
negatively correlated with US government debt over GDP ratio, suggesting substitution
between safe bonds and corporate bonds from the perspective of investors. Nevertheless,
due to the two effects mentioned above, the evidence from data on the relationship between
risky consumer debt and safe bonds is mixed. We take a slightly different approach from
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012), as the risk-free rate is a “shadow ” price in
our model. Figure 1.5(a) plots risk-free rate and consumer debt over GDP ratio. It shows
the two time-series positively co-move at certain times while not at other times. The overall
correlation is -0.075 but insignificant. Table 1.9 (b) shows that the simulated model generates
an insignificant correlation coefficient of 0.0009 between risk-free rate rf and consumer debt
over GDP ratio |θ
d,oW o|
W o+W p
. The insignificance of the correlation coefficients highlights two
countervailing forces: we would observe positive co-movement if the two series are driven by
rare event risk; reverse co-movement if they are driven by belief dispersion. As a result, when
taken together, the two effects would offset each other and leave an insignificant correlation
coefficient, as shown both in the data and model. However, if we decompose the risk-free rate
into the rare event risk component and belief dispersion component respectively as indicated
by the regression in Table 1.7, it clearly shows that the rare event risk part strongly positively
co-moves with Debt over GDP ratio while belief dispersion strongly and reversely co-moves
with Debt over GDP ratio.
Similar pattern shows up in the relationship between borrower’s leverage and risk-free
rate. As for the data, We use FODSP, Household Financial Obligations as a percent of
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Disposable Personal Income, from FRED to measure the household leverage. Figure 1.5 (b)
plots the FODSP and risk-free rate over time. The correlation is 0.033 but not significant.
In the model , θd,o can be interpreted as household leverage and the simulation shows the
correlation between θd,o and risk-free rate is -0.0003 and insignificant. Nevertheless, if we
compute the correlation between household leverage and rare event risk component and belief
dispersion component of the risk-free rate respectively, we see a strong positive correlation
between leverage and rare event risk component while a strong negative one between leverage
and belief dispersion component.
Last but not least, the regression results in Table 1.6 and Table 1.7 indicate that the credit
spread decreases and the risk-free rate increases with the relative wealth share. To clearly
see the effect, we fix belief dispersion and rare event intensity and plots the credit spread and
relative wealth share in Figure 1.6. In this way, the credit spread variation is only driven by
the endogenous variation of the relative wealth share. This relationship is very intuitive. As
the wealth share increases, the optimists in the economy possess most of the wealth and the
average (wealth-weighted) beliefs of the market will stand closer to their belief. The asset
prices will reflect such an average belief. This is in the same spirit of Xiong and Yan (2010):
they showed that to replicate the heterogeneous beliefs economy in a complete market, a
representative agent should have the wealth-weighted belief. As a consequence, the risk-free
rate rises and it is more costly for the optimists to issue debt. They reduce their leverage
positions and credit spread falls. This implication is also consistent with the empirical fact:
the optimists tend to possess more wealth in the good times when the credit spread is low.
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If we go extreme and let the wealth share ω →∞, i.e. the optimists dominate in the market,
the model economy reduces to a representative agent economy. In that case, there is only
one debt whose rate rf is determined by the representative agent, and the credit spread
rd − rf shrinks to zero.
1.3.7 Discussion
1.3.7.1 Link to 2008 financial crisis
Household debt is one precipitating factor of 2008 financial crisis 16. Our model features
three fundamental state variables: belief dispersion, rare event risk and relative wealth
distribution, and they can capture dynamics of several macroeconomic variables both pre
and post-crisis.
Before the crisis, belief dispersion increases over time (Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin
(2013)) and optimism drives households to take more leverage. Although we follow the
convention in the literature to call the risky asset “stock”, it can also be interpreted as
housing services, after all “real estate is an important asset that pays off housing services,
a major consumption good” (Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007)). Cheng, Raina, and
Xiong (2014) also emphasizes the role of distorted belief on the recent crisis and provides
direct empirical evidence on beliefs and household leverage 17. They found that mid-level
managers in the mortgage-securitisation business increased leverage and housing exposure
16 Paul Krugman wrote in New York Times on Dec 12, 2010: “The root of our current troubles lies in the
debt American families ran up during the Bush-era housing bubble. Twenty years ago, the average American
household’s debt was 83 percent of its income; by a decade ago, that had crept up to 92 percent; but by late
2007, debts were 130 percent of income.”
17 Other literature that debate the possibility of distorted beliefs influencing house prices include Himmel-
berg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Smith and Smith (2006) and Shiller (2007)
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during the boom period by purchasing second home and swapping into more expensive homes
and performed worse than some control group, suggesting that they wishfully believed the
housing price would soar and were unaware of the potential housing market crash risk,
though they arguably had more private information regarding housing market and price.
Nevertheless, although belief dispersion got wider over time, the credit spread does not
become extremely high. It is rooted in low rare event risk. The rare event risk before the
crisis is relatively low. Using far-out-of-money put option prices with maturity ranging from
one month to six months, Barro and Liao (2016) estimated rare disaster probability and
showed that the rare event risk is low between 2004 to end of 2007. Siriwardane (2015) also
reached a similar conclusion based option prices data. Moreover, although it is challenging
to directly measure the relative wealth ratio between the optimists and pessimists, it is not
hard to see that the wealth-weighted belief does not tilt toward the pessimist and hence also
contributes to low credit spread.
After the crisis, belief dispersion decreases and therefore less borrowing and lending are
expected to occur in the market. Yet, the rare event risk peaking around 2008-2009 and the
associated flight-to-quality causes the credit spread to increase and risk-free rate to decrease
at the same time. Moreover the wealth loss of the optimists during the crisis shifts the
average belief toward the pessimists and thus exacerbate the increased credit spread and
decreased risk-free rate.
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1.3.7.2 Default Trigger γ
One critical element in our model is γ. γ represents how the lenders and borrowers define
“default”, i.e. the default happens when the net worth of the borrowers suddenly changes
by γ. Apparently, different γ would affect the optimist’s choice on θo, θd,o and subsequently
on k̄, which is directly linked to credit spread. In the model, we calibrated γ to match the
correlation coefficient in Table 1.5. Yet, it is necessary to study the effect of tightening or
loosing “γ” on the credit spread.
We conduct such comparative statics study in Table 1.11. Athreya and Neelakantan (2011)
roughly estimated 40% as an upper bound for household net worth shock in normal times.
Given the two features of the rare event risk: scarce and catastrophic, we consider γ in the
range of [−70%,−40%]. As it shows in the table, the credit spread keeps decreasing as we
relax γ. As γ gets smaller, it requires a larger net worth shock to set off the default and
writedown terms in the debt contract and therefore the required return on risky bonds would
also become smaller. This is also demonstrated by the default boundary k̄ which becomes
smaller with γ, meaning a larger endowment contraction to trigger the default when γ is
smaller. Note that the average position on stock θo also decreases as γ gets smaller. This is
because that, as γ gets smaller, the optimist is not “insured ” against less severe jumps any
more and therefore becomes increasingly wary.
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1.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we present a dynamic general equilibrium model to study the credit spread
over consumer debt, in particular the link between systematic risk and consumer debt. The
model generates credit spread and risk-free rate comparable to real data and it particularly
implies that rare event risk, belief dispersion as well as relative wealth distribution jointly
determine the credit spread and risk-free rate. Although previous empirical studies have
documented their relationship pairwise, our model is the first one to account for belief
dispersion, credit spread and risk-free rate at the same time and point out the underlying
economic mechanisms.
One major theory contribution of our paper is to introduce endogenous default in rare
disaster models. The endogenous default set-up allows us to discover the links between debt
default and belief dispersion as well as rare event risk that are missing in existing rare disaster
literature. Moreover, by assuming jump size follows a generalized logistic distribution, we are
able to derive the credit spread in closed-form and discuss comparative statics analytically.
There are two important questions that our model does not cover. First, the model does
not explicitly characterize labor income. The agent faces undiversifiable labor income risk
and a significant unanticipated adverse labor income shock18 is one reason why the agent
defaults on debt (Lopes (2008), Chatterjee et al. (2007a)). Second, all the debt contracts
in the model are short-term. In fact, they are all instantaneous bonds. In reality, bonds of
various of maturities are traded in the market. However, given the market is incomplete in
18 For example, an economic disaster can also cause massive unemployment.
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our model, the availability of new securities might change the equilibrium. How the bonds
of longer maturities may affect the market equilibrium is not clear. We leave these questions
for future research.
1.5 Proofs
1.5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
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After some algebra, (1.45) becomes
− σ2kθ2∗ +
(
(µ− r)k − σ2
)
θ∗ + µ− r + λk = 0 (1.47)
The discriminant, 4, is
4 =
(
(µ− r)k − σ2
)2
+ 4σ2k (µ− r + λk)
=
(
(µ− r)k + σ2
)2
+ 4σ2k2λ > 0 (1.48)
implying the equation (1.47) has two distinct roots, θ1 and θ2. Based on the relationship

































1.5.2 Proof of Proposition 2
In the proof, we assume that λ, µo and µp are constants. This can be regarded as a special
case of the model in Section 1.3. The assumption is innocuous: agents with logarithmic
utility functions are “myopic” in the sense that their decisions today just depend on today’s
state variables without looking forward in the future. The advantage of treating λ, µo and
µp constants is to reduce state variables for Bellman Equation and save the space.
The proof follows 3 steps:
1. Conjecture the value function and derive the first order conditions
2. Construct a series of discrete random variables k(n) (or equivalently, Y (n)) to approx-
imate k (or Y ). And solve the consumption and portfolio choice under the discrete
approximation, prove the equilibrium exists and verify the conjectures in step (1).
3. Let n → ∞, k(n) → k and Y (n) → Y but portfolio choice θo → 1. Hence, no trade
occurs in the market.
To be clear, we re-state the agent’s problem and equilibrium definition in the “safe-debt-only”

































Definition 2. A competitive equilibrium of the “safe-debt-only” market is composed of
{θo, θp, co, cp} and prices { rf , S} such that
1. Given prices { rf , S}, θo, co solve the optimist’s problem 3
2. Given prices { rf , S}, θp, cp solve the pessimist’s problem similar to 3
3. Market Clears, i.e.
(a) coW o + cpW p = E
(b) θoW o + θpW p = S
(c) (1− θo)W o + (1− θp)W p = 0
Step 1
Denote J the value function of a representative optimistic agent. It is not hard to see that








= f1(ωt−) dt+ f2(ωt−)dzt + f3(ωt−)dNt (1.52)
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where f1, f2, f3 are some function of ωt− satisfying regular conditions.
The conjecture 1 says the dynamics of ω is autonomous and is not affected by W i, i ∈
{o, p}. And this will be confirmed later.












t + f3(ωt−) dNt (1.53)
Conjecture 2.








= µ+ρ−λE[k]. All conjectures will be confirmed
below.
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From first order conditions,












Similar to (1.58) and (1.59), we can derive the consumption and portfolio choice by the
pessimistic agent.













To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, we need market clearing conditions.
coW o + cpW p = E (1.62)
θoW o + θpW p = S (1.63)
(1− θo)W o + (1− θp)W p = 0 (1.64)
With (1.63) and (1.64),
W o +W p = S (1.65)
With (1.62), (1.59) and (1.61),










= (µ− λE[k]) dt+ σ dzt + k dNt (1.68)
This confirms the Conjecture 2.
From (1.64),
θp = 1 + ω (1− θo) (1.69)
And substitute (1.69) in (1.60):
0 = µp − λE[k] + ρ− rf − σ2 (1 + ω (1− θo)) + λE
[
k





0 = (µp − µo)− σ2 (1− θo) (1 + ω) + λE
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We now work with k by approximating it with a sequence of discrete random variables k(n),
defined as
{k(n) = k(n)l+1} = k
(n)
l < k ≤ k
(n)
l+1 (1.72)
where −1 = k(n)0 < k
(n)
1 < ... < k
(n)
n = ∞ is a partition of interval (−1,∞) associated with
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and let n → ∞
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eventually.
As n gets greater, k
(n)
1 < 0. For the aforementioned reason, wealth has to stay positive












0 = (µp − µo)−σ2 (1− θo) (1 + ω)+λE
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H (θo) = (µp − µo)− σ2 (1− θo) (1 + ω) + λE
[
k(n)








It is easy to see that
H (θo) < 0, as θo → 1 (1.79)













H (θo) = 0. Also, Conjecture 2 can be easily verified. It shows the equilibrium exists under
the approximating discrete distributions k(n) for jump amplitude.
Step 3















There is no trade and the equilibrium breaks down.
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1.5.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In the proof, we assume that λ, µo and µp are constants. This can be regarded as a
special case of the model in Section 1.3. Moreover, the assumption is innocuous: agents
with logarithmic utility functions are “myopic” in the sense that their decisions today just
depend on today’s state variables without looking forward in the future. The advantage of
treating λ, µo and µp constants is to reduce state variables for Bellman Equation and save
the space.
Proof Steps Roadmap
1. Conjecture stock price dS
S
and value function J and derive first order conditions.
2. Solve for consumption choice and verify the conjectures in step (1); also solve for credit
spread.
3. Solve for portfolio choice on stock and provide conditions for the equilibrium to exist.
To be clear, we re-state the agent’s problem and equilibrium definition here. They are similar




































are given by (1.23), (1.26) and (1.25). θo and θd,o are optimist’s
positions on stock and risky debt.
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Definition 3. A competitive equilibrium of the “defaultable debt” market is composed of
{θo, θd,o, θp, θd,p, co, cp} and prices { r, rf , S} and debt contract variable k̄ such that
1. Given prices { rd, rf , S} and debt contract variable k̄, θo, θd,o, co solve the optimist’s
problem 4
2. Given prices { rd, rf , S} and debt contract variable k̄, θp, θd,p, cp solve the pessimist’s
problem similar to 4.
3. Default occurs when the optimist’s net worth drops no less than 100|γ|%, i.e. θoks ≤ γ;
If default occurs, the writedown kd = k, otherwise kd = 0.
4. Given debt contract variable k̄, all market Clears, i.e.
(a) coW o + cpW p = E
(b) θoW o + θpW p = S
(c) θd,oW o + θd,pW p = 0
5. The optimists and pessimists are engaged in the non-cooperative, fully decentralized
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µo + ρ− λE[k]− rf − θoσ2 + λE
[
k
1 + θok + θd,okd
]
= 0 (1.88)
rd − rf + λE
[
kd
1 + θok + θd,okd
]
= 0 (1.89)
co − ρ = 0 (1.90)
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Similarly, we can write down the Bellman equation and first order conditions for the pes-
simists.










= (µ− λE[k]) dt+ σ dzt + k dNt (1.92)
Given we look for a threshold equilibrium for kd, i.e.
kd =

0, if k > k̄
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1 + (θo + θd,o) (ey − 1)
pY (y) dy (1.96)
Hence, from (1.88), (1.95) and (1.96), we get
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The credit spread, rd − rf
rd − rf =− λE
[
k
1 + (θo + θd,o)k




























k̄ + 1) + log(k̄ + 2))
(1− 2 (θo + θd,o))4
)
(1.98)
Note (1.98) does not involve any beliefs heterogeneity, unlike (1.97) ((1.97) contains a term
µo ). Thus we conjecture in equilibrium,
θo + θd,o = 1 (1.99)
θp + θd,p = 1 (1.100)
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This conjecture satisfies the market clearing condition of risk-free bonds. In addition, it
shows the risk-free interest rate is a truly “shadow” rate: both agents invest zero proportion
of their wealth in the risk-free bonds.










The last step is to solve θo and θp. With first order conditions (1.97), its counterpart of
pessimist’s, market clearing condition:
θoω + θp = 1 + ω (1.102)
Also note that in equilibrium the threshold k̄ must satisfy
θok̄ = γ (1.103)
With these conditions, θo is the solution for the following equation
µo − µp = Q (θo;ω, γ) (1.104)
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where
Q (θo;ω, γ) = θoσ2 − σ2(−θoω + ω + 1)− λ
(
−6(θ
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Q (θo;ω, γ) = Q (1, ω, γ) = 0 (1.108)
lim
θo→0








Q (θo;ω, γ) is well defined.
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1.5.4 Proof of Theorem 1
In the proof, we assume that λ, µo and µp are constants. This can be regarded as a
special case of the model in Section 1.3. Moreover, the assumption is innocuous: agents
with logarithmic utility functions are “myopic” in the sense that their decisions today just
depend on today’s state variables without looking forward in the future. The advantage of
treating λ, µo and µp constants is to reduce state variables for Bellman Equation and save
the space.
The steps for proving theorem 1 is similar to those in Proposition 3. We skip over the
conjecture step and state the first order conditions directly.
From (1.32):
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rd + rd̃ − rf = µo + ρ− λE[k]− θoσ2 + λE[ k
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(1.113)
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is the marginal rate of substitution given the jump
happens at t.
Similarly, we can derive the first order conditions for the pessimists. In equilibrium, θo is
the solution of the following equation:
µo − µp = Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) (1.115)
where Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) := 1θo∈(1, 1
ω
+1]Q (θ
o;ω, γ) + 1θo∈[ 1
ω
+1,∞)Q̃ (θ
o, ω, γ, ζ). Q̃ (θo, ω, γ, ζ) is
given in equation (1.120). Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) consists of two parts: θo ∈ (1, 1
ω
+ 1], Q (θo;ω, γ),
when belief dispersion is mild and risky bond for positive jump is not needed for trade to
happen between agents; and θo ∈ [ 1
ω
+ 1,∞), Q̃ (θo, ω, γ, ζ), when belief dispersion is large,
risky bond for positive jump is issued by short sellers to cover the position on stock. We
have the following observation
Lemma 1. Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) is a continuous function on (1,∞)











Q̃ (θo, ω, γ, ζ) (1.116)
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Lemma 2. There exists a solution θo in (1,∞) to equation (1.115)
Proof. Note
Q (1;ω, γ, ζ) = 0 (1.117)
lim
θo→∞
Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) ' σ2θo(1 + ω)→∞ (1.118)
Therefore, by intermediate value theorem, there exists θo in (1,∞) to equation (1.115)
Still, as in the proof of Proposition 3, θo + θd,o = θo + θd̃,o = 1, hence equilibrium credit
spread is
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Notes: Data Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Re-





Volatility of aggregate endowment growth σ 3.44%
Long-run average growth of the aggregate endowment µ̄ 1.55%
Volatility of the expected endowment growth σµ 1.1%
Mean reversion of the expected endowment growth αµ 0.05
Time preference ρ 0.03
Default Trigger γ = ζ -70%
Beliefs Formation Parameters
Behavior Bias φ 9.7
Volatility of the signal(s) σs 0.55%
Disaster Risk Parameters
Long-run annual probability of disaster λ̄ 3.63%
Volatility of disaster risk σλ 0.081
Mean reversion of disaster risk αλ 0.11
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Table 1.4
Annual Belief dispersion, Risk-free Rate and Credit Spread.
Data Model
Beliefs Dispersion 1.23% 1.29%
(0.71%) (0.98%)
Risk-free Rate 1.07% 0.57%
(2.89%) (1.01%)
Credit Spread 249.53 224.52
(102.63) (139.62)
Probability of Default ≤ 1% 0.59%
Notes. Model parameters are listed in Table 1.3.
Standard Deviation are in parentheses.
Data Source: Philadelphia Fed Survey of Profes-




Correlation Coefficients between beliefs dispersion, credit spread and risk-
free Rate
Panel I: Correlation Coefficients [Data]
Belief Dispersion Credit Spread Risk-free Rate
Belief Dispersion 1
Credit Spread 0.099 1
Risk-free Rate -0.023 -0.101 1
(a)
Panel II: Correlation Coefficients [Model]
Belief Dispersion Credit Spread Risk-free Rate
Belief Dispersion 1
Credit Spread 0.077 1
Risk-free Rate -0.019 -0.069 1
(b)
Notes. γ is calibrated to match the average correlation coefficients between
credit spread, risk-free rate and belief dispersion.
All data in Panel I span from 1981 to 2016 on a quarterly basis. Hodrick-




Regression of Credit Spread







Relative Wealth Distribution -0.0006
(0.000)
R2 0.988
Notes. P-values are in parentheses.
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Table 1.7
Regression of Risk-free Rate







Relative Wealth Distribution 0.0001
(0.675)
R2 0.005
Notes. P-values are in parentheses.
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Table 1.8
Correlations between equilibrium k̄ and µo − µp, λ in the model.
Correlations between k̄ and
Beliefs Dispersion µo − µp 0.69
Rare Event Risk λ -0.39
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Table 1.9
































Correlation Coefficient between household leverage (FODSP) and risk-free
rate.
Correlation Coefficients[Data]
Household Leverage Risk-Free Rate
Household Leverage 1.000
Risk-free Rate 0.033 1.000
(a)
Correlation Coefficients [Model]
Household Leverage Risk-Free Rate
Household Leverage (θd,o) 1.000












Comparative Statics of γ
γ
-40% -50% -60% -70%
Credit Spread 239.54 236.67 232.12 224.53
Volatility of Credit Spread 152.31 149.80 145.88 139.63
Probability of Default 0.78% 0.73% 0.66% 0.59%
Default boundary k̄ -19.90% -24.94% -30.16% -35.80%
Risky Asset Holdings θo = γ
k̄
2.010 2.005 1.989 1.955
Risk-free Rate rf 0.575% 0.573% 0.572% 0.567%
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Household Debt and Corporate Debt
Household (solid line) and Corporate debt (dashed line) outstanding (in billions).
Data Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (https://www.
federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/d3.htm)
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Figure 1.2 Comparison of different distributions for modeling jump size param-
eter Y
The solid blue line is p.d.f of standard normal distribution; the green dot-dashed
line is p.d.f of the generalized logistic distribution used in the current paper; the





Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) as a function of ω and θo
Figure 1.3 (a) plots Q (θo;ω, γ), the part of Q (θo;ω, γ, ζ) when short selling does
not occur, as a function of θo and ω.
Figure 1.3 (b) plots Q̃ (θo;ω, γ, ζ) as a function of θo and ω when short selling
occurs.
Note that the upper bounds of Q (θo;ω, γ) are the starting points for Q̃ (θo;ω, γ, ζ),
i.e. the two functions can be “glued” together seamlessly.
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Figure 1.4 (a) plots the position on risky assets θo (solid line, left axis) and k̄ = γθo
(dashed line, right axis) as functions of belief dispersion µo − µp.
Figure 1.4 (b) plots the position on risk-free bonds 1 − θo − θd,o as a function of
belief dispersion µo−µp . The rest parameters used in the example of comparative






































(b) Household Leverage and Risk-Free Rate
Figure 1.5
Figure 1.5(a) plots the the consumer debt over GDP ratio (dashed line, left axis)
and risk-free rate (solid line, right-axis, in percentage) from 1978 to 2016. Shaded
areas indicate NBER recession dates.
Figure 1.5(b) plots the household leverage (dotted line, left axis) and risk-free rate
(solid line, right-axis, in percentage) from 1980 to 2016. Shaded areas indicate
NBER recession dates.
Data Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Figure 1.6 (b) plots the risk-free rate rfas a function of relative wealth share
ω = W
o
Wp . The rest parameters used in the example are: µ
o − µp = 1.23%, ρ =
3%, σ = 3.44%, λ = 3.63%, γ = −70%.
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Chapter 2
Scooping Up Own Debt On the
Cheap: The Effect Of Corporate
Bonds Buyback on Firm’s Credit
Condition
2.1 Introduction
It is well known that firms have trouble issuing new bonds to raise funding during economic
recessions . However, an intriguing fact is that many firms are engaged in bonds buyback
at the same time. As noted by the Wall Street Journal during the burst of dot-com bubble
(Newswires (2000)):
“ It’s not just investors who are bargain-hunting amid the beaten-down sectors of the
corporate-bond market. Companies themselves are beginning to buy back their own debt at
discount prices”
...
“Stater Brothers Holdings Inc., a Southern California supermarket chain with strong
single-B ratings, saw its bonds fall 20 points to about 80 cents on the dollar after reporting
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a net loss of $9.1 million in May. Confident that it would be able to engineer a turnaround,
it retired about $11 million of its debt, realizing an extraordinary gain of $1.1 million.”
The same also has occurred during the Great Recession. An article in the Wall Street
Journal (Ng (2009)) has noted that
“A number of corporations are quietly buying back bonds on the cheap in the open market
as the financial system works its way out of crisis mode. They are taking advantage of
depressed prices to save millions of dollars in interest and debt-repayment costs.”
Not only bonds buyback is an important corporate finance strategy at micro level, it is
also an economically important macroeconomic factor. Using debt repurchase data cover
the 1996-2011 period, Julio (2013) documented that total debt repurchase activity has been
increasing over time, from $11.7 billion in 1996 to $65.3 billion in 2011. In addition, it also
shows cyclical pattern at an aggregate level. Begenau and Salomao (2014), Covas and Haan
(2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) found that debt repurchase is countercyclical.
The countercyclicality of debt repurchase might also contribute to the procyclicality of debt
maturity. Chen, Xu, and Yang (2012) found that the average debt maturity is longer in
economic expansions than in recessions. This is not surprising given the fact that firms
tend to buy more long-term bonds than short-term ones when buying back bonds: Julio
(2013) showed that the average maturity of debt drops from 10.84 years to 6.90 years after
repurchase.
Despite the significant role played by debt buyback in the financial markets and in the
economy, few academic literature has studied it. In this paper, I provide a dynamic structural
model for corporate debt buyback. The paper focuses on two questions. The first question is
how debt buyback affects on firm’s default decision and credit rating. The second question
is how liquidity, which is usually scarce during recession, affects firm’s buyback decision.
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Indeed, the two questions are related. As previous literature including He and Xiong (2012),
Ericsson and Renault (2006) and Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007) pointed out, credit risk and
liquidity risk are intricately interconnected. However, to better understand their connection
qualitatively and quantitatively, one also needs to consider firm’s strategies thoroughly such
as rollover and debt buyback when they face those risks.
To study these questions, I employ and augment Leland and Toft (1996) model and provide
a much more general framework accounting for both debt rollover and repurchase. As in
Leland’s model, the firm’s assets are exogenous and follow a geometric Brownian motion.
However, the firm commits itself to a stationary debt maturity structure not only by issuing
new debt but also buying back outstanding debt. Depending on the firm’s current assets,
issuing new debt, paying off maturing debt and buying back outstanding debt can result in
capital gain or loss which equity holders have to assume. Any gain would be paid out to
equity holders right away and any loss would be paid off by a new contribution from equity
holders. The equity holders decide to default when assets drop to an endogenous threshold
chosen by the equity holders; i.e. when the equity value reaches zero and the firm stops
servicing the debt.
As for the first question, I find that the firm strategically chooses how much debt to buy
back and the buyback program reduces the firm’s probability of default and consequently
improves its credit ratings, relative to the case where the firm does not buy back any out-
standing bonds. Moreover, the effect of corporate debt buyback on the firm’s credit risk
changes with leverage. The model shows that higher leveraged firms are more actively en-
gaged in bonds buyback and the firm’s credit condition improves more as a result of the
buyback program. The model also shows that debt buyback strategy allows firm to employ
more debt and the optimal leverage ratio is higher than what early models predicted.
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With regard to the second question, I discuss how market liquidity condition affects equity
holder’s optimal buyback strategy and, as a feedback, how the strategy dampens the adverse
effect of liquidity drought. As market liquidity is well known to be pro-cyclical, the connec-
tion between market liquidity and buyback also shed light on the countercyclicality of debt
buyback. The model shows that as market liquidity dries up, the firm tends to buy back
more bonds from secondary market. As a consequence, the firm opportunistically exploiting
the market liquidity condition reduces the unfavorable impact of liquidity deterioration on
the firm’s credit condition. Following He and Xiong (2012), we quantify the effect of bonds
buyback on the firm’s credit risk. Depending on the size of liquidity shock, the buyback can
reduce the credit spread in an amount of around 10 to 15 basis points for Investment-Grade
A firm; and reduce the credit spread in an amount of around 20 to 60 basis points for Spec-
ulative Grade BB firms. This also echoes the empirical discovery in Julio (2013) that firm
with lower credit ratings are more likely to repurchase debt from secondary market.
I discuss the underlying mechanism and economic intuition behind the results. In the
model, equity holders would stop servicing the debt and declare bankruptcy when the assets
value is too low. Buying back outstanding bonds when their market price is low can transfer
value from bondholders to equity holders. The increased equity value therefore incentivizes
equity holders willing to bail out the firm until a much lower assets value and reduces the
credit risk of the firm overall. We characterize the value transfer to equity holders and
consistent with the results aforementioned, as liquidity cost rises, equity holders tend to
buy back more bonds and total value transfer is more substantial. In addition to the value
transfer, reduced debt overhang acts as an amplification mechanism. We shows that reduced
overhang improves return of equity when assets value becomes higher in the future and thus
amplifies the initial value transfer effect. However, as the firm buys back more outstanding
bonds, the premium for investors to sell or tender their bonds also goes up. The benefit and
cost of bonds buyback eventually determines the optimal buyback strategy.
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Our model assumes that the equity holders make the decision on how much debt to buy
back. Like most decision variables in corporate finance e.g. investment and leverage, the
amount (or proportion) of debt to repurchase also subjects to agency cost.An interesting yet
understudied question is to gauge the agency cost on debt buyback. To do so, we compare
the equity maximizing debt buyback with the firm-value maximizing debt buyback for firms
of different leverages. The model suggests that equity holders tend to under-buy-back the
debt for low leverage firms while over-buy-back the debt if the leverage is high. Equity
holders choose how much debt to buy back and endogenous default threshold jointly to
maximize the equity value. When leverage is low, market value of the debt is less discounted
relative to the principal and value transfer is limited, and as a result equity holders would
like to choose a smaller proportion of the debt to repurchase and higher default boundary.
Although a slight more repurchase of debt increases overall debt value, it will hurt equity
holders. When the leverage is high, debt value is greatly discounted and value transfer is
considerable. Equity holders thus have incentive to buy back much of the outstanding debt
from the secondary market. However, a significant amount of the value becomes deadweight
loss during the buyback transaction and it is not efficient tot the firm overall.
Given the importance of debt financing in US financial market and economy relative to
equity as well as the huge literature on share repurchase, the early research on debt buyback
is really scarce. Kruse, Nohel, and Todd (2014) analyzes the impact of debt tender offers
on stock market. They found that debt tender offers increase return of equity in general.
Mao and Tserlukevich (2014) builds up a static model and found that debt is cheaper when
the outstanding bouds are held by many dispersed creditors. They also argued that debt
repurchase increase firm value ex-ante as it makes capital structure more flexible. Another
strand of literature focused on debt restructuring when the firm is financial distress. Gertner
and Scharfstein (1991) analyzes the condition under which debt-for-equity is exchange is
profitable. Cornett and Travlos (1989) analyzes wealth transfer between different security
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holders during debt restructuring. The present paper is the first dynamic model to study
debt repurchase and quantify the effect of debt repurchase on the firm’s credit risk. The
model also identifies the lower default boundary chosen by equity holders as a new mechanism
for firm value to increase ex-ante.
Our model also contributes to a large literature on corporate debt maturity structure,
rollover risk and liquidity risk. Among early studies, Almeida et al. (2009) shows firms with
large amount of bonds that matured during the 2008 crisis reduced more investments than
the others. Harford, Klasa, and Maxwell (2014) analyzes that firm can use cash holdings to
mitigate rollover risk when the debt has a short maturity. Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer
(2011) explains frequent rollover is one important factor that leads to a sudden freeze in the
availability of short-term, secured borrowing. These papers mostly focus on the unfavorable
impact of liquidity risk on the firm via debt rollover. Yet, as mentioned before, in reality
the firm use sophisticate corporate finance strategies, such as issuing bonds of different
maturities(Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner (2014),Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2016) )
and buying back cheap bonds, to lessen the adverse effect or even take advantage of the
depressed market situation. Accordingly, a more precise assessment of the effect of liquidity
risk as well as firm’s debt maturity structure calls for a model featuring the strategies.
The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In section 2.2, I introduce several stylized
facts about debt buyback to motivate the model; Section 2.3 provides a general framework
to study bonds rollover and buyback; Section 2.4 parameterizes the general framework and
studies the effect of debt buyback on the firm’s credit risk and liquidity risk; Section 2.5
discusses other important variables firms have to take into consideration when repurchasing
bonds from market and concludes.
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2.2 Stylized Facts
Our model aims at replicating several stylized facts on debt buyback. To motivate our model,
we draw existing empirical literature on macroeconomics, finance, accounting and law, and
summarize several stylized facts on debt buyback in this section.
1. Debt buyback is countercyclical
Literature on macroeconomics and business cycles have widely documented that
debt buyback is countercyclical. Using Flow of Funds Accounts of the Federal Reserve
Board, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) shows that debt repurchase is strongly counter-
cyclical. In Figure 2.1 , we plot both debt repurchase as well as credit spread for BofA
Merrill Lynch US corporate AA and B firms. Credit spread is also known for moving
counter-cyclically over business cycle and it is a critical variable representing cost of
debt finance that firms have to take into account. It clearly shows that strong coun-
tercyclicality of debt repurchase activity by firms. Begenau and Salomao (2014) uses
CRSP/Compustat Merged Fundamentals Quarterly reached the similar conclusion for
both small and large firms.
The macroeconomic literature usually focus on firm’s trade-off between equity and
debt over business cycle and emphasize the effect of borrowing constraint on the trade-
off. Moreover, they also usually define debt repurchase as reduction in outstanding
debt. A reduction in outstanding debt does not necessarily mean that firms are “re-
purchasing” debt. It could simply means that firm temporarily suspend issuing new
debt after outstanding debt matures. To examine the actual debt repurchase activity
in details, Figure 2.2 plots the yearly data of open market repurchase and tender offers
firm engage in bonds market from Julio (2013), along with credit spread of BofA Mer-
rill Lynch AA and B firms. Table 2.5 also calculate the correlation coefficients between
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open market repurchase, tender offers and credit spread. The correlation coefficients
show that the debt buyback activity is still countercyclical.
2. Debt buyback can be achieved in various ways
When firms try to buy back debt from secondary market, there are numerous ways
to do so. The typical methods include open market repurchase, tender offer, debt-for-
equity exchange.
Open market repurchase means the issuer firm directly buys back bonds from sec-
ondary market. The firm can remain anonymous and take advantage of the distressed
debt pricing. However, open market repurchase can only buy back a small proportion
of outstanding bonds in a short time and subject to a serious of legal restrictions. For
the firm to buy back a larger proportion of bonds in a short time, tender offer is often
employed. Moreover, if ever there are covenants restricting debt repurchase, a con-
sent solicitation approved by certain number of bonds holders can slack the covenant.
To tender a large amount of bonds, the firm has to offer a compelling premium to
the bondholders and this makes tender offer very costly. Debt-for-equity exchange (or
debt-to-equity swap) is often used by firms in financial distress or short of cash holdings
(Butler (2010)). Debt-for-equity exchange is similar to tender offer in many aspects.
However, by exchanging debt for equity, the firm avoids using cash. All these methods
have their own advantages and disadvantages and are substitutes for each other. For
example, Table 2.5 shows the correlation between open market repurchase and tender
offers are negatively correlated, implying the firm substitutes one with the other during
the sample period.
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The debt buyback approach in our model can be interpreted as either open market
repurchase or tender offer or debt-for-equity swap1. As in most Leland-type models,
our model does not feature cash holdings. We discuss the role of cash hoardings in
debt buyback in Section 2.5.
3. Debt buyback is correlated with firm and debt characteristics
Julio (2013) found that debt buyback improves the firm’s investment distortions.
Firms with higher leverage are more likely to repurchase debt, as the improvement is
more salient for higher leverage firms. He also discovered that average credit ratings
for repurchased bonds prior to the repurchase are declining and while the credit ratings
stabilize and even increases following the buyback. Xu (2014) found similar pattern,
although she mainly focused on callable bonds.
Debt characteristics also affect firm’s buyback activities. Julio (2013) found that
firms bought back more long-term bonds than short term bonds, with average ma-
turity being 10.84 years for repurchased debt prior to repurchase whilst the average
maturity shortens to 6.9 years after repurchase. Moreover, firms are more likely to
buy back convertible bonds through open market repurchase instead of tender offer.
Open market repurchase consists of 40% convertible bonds while tender offer is only
composed of 6.7%.
2.3 The Model
In this section, I provide a general framework to study bonds rollover and buyback based on
Leland and Toft (1996).
1 Another important way to buy back bonds is to write the call provision in the initial contract at date-0,
i.e. issuing callable bonds. This feature makes callable bonds different from other buyback methods we
mentioned here. For details of pricing callable bonds and their effect on the firm’s default risk, see Acharya
and Carpenter (2002), Jarrow et al. (2010) and Leland (1998)
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2.3.1 Firm and Assets
Unlevered value of firm’s assets V follows a geometric Brownian motion given by
dV
V
= (r − δ)dt+ σdz (2.1)
where {zt} is a standard Brownian motion. r is the risk-free interest rate; δ is the payout
rate; σ is the volatility of asset value; r, σ, δ are assumed to be constants.
2.3.2 Debt Structure
Suppose firm has 1 unit of outstanding debt in total and time-to-maturities, s, are distributed
on a finite interval [0, T ]. To isolate the effect of maturity structure, all of the outstanding
bonds are assumed to be of equal seniority. 1 unit of outstanding debt allows us to use a
probability density function κt(s) to denote the amount (or, fraction) of debt maturing in
s periods from date t. Specifically, there are bonds in the amount of κt(s) ds with time-to-
maturity s at date t, and κt(s) satisfies
∫ T
0
κt(s)ds = 1 (2.2)
Also let Kt(s) denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function. We make the
following assumptions.
Assumption 5. Equity holders control the firm and commit to a stationary structure through
continuously repurchasing debt as well as rolling over maturing debt. See Figure 2.3.
Assumption 6. The debt structure κt(s) takes U-shape. Formally, κt(s) ≤ 0 ,∀s ∈ [0, T ∗]
and κt(s) ≥ 0 ,∀s ∈ [T ∗, T ].
Consistent with empirical evidences, a U-shape κt(s) implies that the firm issues more
short-term debt and buys back more long-term debt. The second assumption is not critical,
as the model can be modified easily to accommodate any debt structure κt(s).
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A stationary debt structure means that
κt(s) = κt+4t(s),∀4t (2.3)
During [t, t+4t], debt repurchasing and issuing does not change the total debt outstanding.































At date t, the debt structure is given by κt(s). The first term accounts for the debt that
matures during [t, t +4t]; The second term accounts for debt buyback from the secondary
market. Note the debt with time-to-maturities ranging over [T ∗, T ] at date t will have time-
to-maturities ranging over [T ∗−4t, T −4t] at date t+4t. This explains the shift of lower
and upper bounds of integrals in term (2); The third term accounts for the debt rollover:
debt that just matured recently is refinanced by issuing new debt with time-to-maturities
ranging over [4t, T ∗] at date t; The fourth term accounts for newly issued debt with maturity
T . The rollover and buyback also shows in Figure 2.3.





































(−κ′t(s))ds+ κt(T ) (2.7)
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The left side of Equation (2.7) is the total reduced bonds, including bonds that just
matured and bought back. The right side of Equation (2.7) is the total bonds newly issued.
Equation (2.7) implies a particular way the firm manages the debt maturity structure by
debt buyback and rollover. At each instant dt, κ(0) dt amount of debt matures; for the
debt with time-to-maturities s ∈ [T ∗, T ], the firm buys an amount of κ′(s) ds dt back from
the open market; The firm also issues new bonds with time-to-maturities s ∈ (0, T ∗] in an
amount of −κ′t(s) ds dt, and new bonds with maturity T in an amount of κ(T ) dt. Eventually,
the firm manages to maintain a stationary debt structure represented by κt(s). Since the
debt maturity structure κt(s) is time-homogeneous and does not depend on t, we will drop
subscript t and use κ(s) to denote it below.
2.3.3 Secondary Market
We follow Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and He and Xiong (2012), assuming an illiquid
secondary bond market. Each bond investor subjects to an idiosyncratic Poisson liquidity
shock with intensity λ. Upon the arrival of the liquidity shock, the bond investor has to sell
his bond holdings at a fractional cost of k, and exit the market. The presence of liquidity
shock, on one hand, causes higher discount and reduces the market value of new bonds; On
the other hand, from the perspective of the firm, it is an great opportunity to buy back
the bonds on fire sale. Intuitively, buying back bonds on cheap has many benefits, such as
decreasing the leverage ratio, reducing the repayment burden in the future and alleviating
debt overhang effect against new investment. Henceforth, we assume that the firm can buy
back a proportion of the bonds sold by bond investors who got struck by liquidity shocks.
We implicitly assume that bond investors do not care to whom they sell the bonds, upon
the arrival of the liquidity shock. This is consistent with the real bonds market. The
secondary bond market is highly illiquid and fragmented than the stock market(Acharya,
Amihud, and Bharath (2013), Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), Bushman, Le, and Vasvari
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(2010)). As documented by Levy and Shalev (2013), the transaction of corporate bonds in
the secondary market usually takes place between two deals over the phone. The dealer who
sells the bonds is not aware of who the end counterparty to the transaction is, whether the
other dealer is buying corporate bonds on behalf of himself or as an agent for a different
party.
Although firms can buy back bonds quietly by open market repurchase, it is subject to
negotiation and the amount of bonds is limited. By paying a premium, firms can buy back
a larger amount of bonds in a shorter time via tender offer. In addition, the information
about the stealthy repurchase is usually disclosed in the following statements and sophisticate
bondholders will take the information into consideration in the future. Either way, firms are
likely to pay a fractional cost φ, which is higher than 1 − k received by bond investors, for
each share of bonds bought back.
Therefore, as can be seen below, given the firm’s default boundary, the debt buyback in
the secondary market does not change the way investors value the bonds. However, the debt
buyback has an significant effect on the firm’s endogenous default boundary and as a result,
affects the market value of the bonds through bondholder’s rational expectation.
2.3.4 Debt Valuation
In this subsection, we characterize the value of bonds. Let VB be the assets value when
equity holders choose to default. Taking VB as given, the current market value of one unit
of debt, d(V, s;VB), with a time-to-maturity of s, coupon payment of c and a principal value
of p when current assets is V satisfies the following partial differential equation (P.D.E):













To pin down the bond price, two boundary conditions are needed. When time-to-maturity
s = 0, the bond investors can claim the principal value p if the assets value V is greater than
the default threshold VB, i.e.
d(V, 0;VB) = p,∀V ≥ VB (2.9)
The other boundary condition describes the payoff to bondholders when equity holders choose
to default. Since all bonds are of equal seniority, the assets value that goes to bonds with
time-to-maturity s upon default is κ(s)VB. Noting the total amount of bonds with time-to-
maturity s is κ(s), each unit of bonds will receive VB as a consequence, i.e.
d(VB, s;VB) = VB,∀s ∈ [0, T ] (2.10)
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The result is similar to the bond price derived in Leland and Toft (1996) and He and
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Xiong (2012). Yet, the total market value of outstanding debt, D(V, s;VB) depends on the




κ(s)d(V, s;VB) ds (2.17)
2.3.5 Equity Valuation
In this subsection, we will derive the equity value E and endogenous default threshold VB.
As there are transaction costs in trading bonds, part of the firm value accrues to neither
bondholders nor equity holders. To derive equity value E, note that E satisfies the following
differential equation
rE = (r − δ)V EV +
σ2
2
V 2EV V︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ δV − (1− π)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
+
κ(T )d(V, T ;VB) +
∫ T ∗
0







κ′(s)d(V, s : VB)ds︸ ︷︷ ︸
5
(2.18)
The left hand side of (2.18) is the required return of holding equity; Term (1) on right
hand side of (2.18) is equity change caused by underlying assets fluctuation. Term (2) is
the payout plus tax benefits of debt minus coupon payment; Term (3) is the market value
of newly issued bonds 2; Term (4) is equity holders’ payment on principal due; Term (5) is
equity holder’s expense on bonds buyback (φ > 0). Note that (2.18) reduces to equation
(11) in He and Xiong (2012) by letting κ = 1
T
.
2.3.5.1 A measure of maturity risk
Before solving (2.18) and deriving default boundary VB, we first examine the terms (3),(4)
and (5), as they are the terms of rollover and buyback and affect equity holders’ decision of
2 The firm might also incur cost when issuing bonds, such as underwriter compensation. I leave out the
cost of issuing bonds as it is not the focus of the current paper.
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default. Assuming firms pay competitive price when buying back the bonds, i.e. φ = 1, the
second line of equation (2.18) becomes











Note (2.20) does not rely on Assumption (2) and can be interpreted as the maturity risk
of debt equity holders face. It is the weighted average of sensitivity of debt market value
with respect to time-to-maturity. However, as we assume that firms pay a premium when
purchasing bonds in the secondary market, φ > 1− k in (2.18). Therefore, term (3),(4) and
(5) in (2.18) do not necessarily have a simple form like (2.20) any more.
2.3.5.2 Equity Valuation
We can solve the equity value, E, in the closed form by guess and verify. The expression of
E is provided in the appendix. The endogenous default boundary VB satisfies smooth-pasting
condition
EV |V=VB = 0 (2.21)
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We are interested in the effect of debt buyback on the default decision by equity holders
and how the effect changes with market liquidity risk. To focus on the questions and put
the model into work, we make two additional assumptions. The goal of the assumptions is






See Figure 2.4. The choice of debt maturity structure echoes Poisson random maturity
model of Leland (1994a) and Leland (1998). Also, it is consistent with the empirical evi-
dence that firms buy back more long-term bonds. More importantly, the probability density




It comes with a simple interpretation that the firm early finances and buys back bonds in
the proportion of β, and rolls over maturing bonds by issuing new bonds with maturity T .
Julio (2013) documented that β is between 5% to 10%. Later we will see that the calibrated
model predicts that the β chosen by equity holders lie within this range.
Assumption 8. φ(β) = (1− k)eψβ, where ψ > 0
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Hence, given the interpretation of β in (2.29), 1
ψ
measures the price elasticity of debt buyback.
The base 1− k, which is received by bondholders when forced to sell, is the lowest price the
firm can get. The parameter ψ and k will be calibrated later.
2.4.1 Model Calibration
To compare and clearly see the effect of debt buyback, I adopt most of parameters from
He and Xiong (2012). I set T = 6, meaning the firm issues bonds with time-to-maturities
spanning from 0 to 6 years. We also set the principal P = 61.68. Coupon c is determined
in a way such that the new debt is issued at par under the condition that the firm is not
engaged in debt buyback, i.e. d(V, T ;V B)|β=0 = p. Powers and Mann (2005) found that
bondholders respond to higher tender premiums by tendering a greater percentage of their
bonds and a 1% increase in tender premium increases the tendering rate by approximately
9%. Thus, we set ψ = 0.11.
The calibrated parameters are listed in Table 3.2.
2.4.2 Default Boundary and Credit risk
In this subsection, I examine how debt buyback affects firm’s decision on default and credit
risk.
Figure 2.5 plot the endogenous default boundary VB and equity value E for different β,
given other parameters listed in Table 3.2. 2.5a shows that there is an optimal β∗ that
maximizes equity value ceteris paribus. Specifically, the equity value first increases with β
until β∗ = 6.85% and then starts to decrease. The default boundary, which shows in 2.5b,
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Baseline Parameters
Debt Tax Benefit Rate π = 0.27
Assets Volatility σ = 0.23
Interest Rate r = 8.0 %
Payout Rate δ = 2.0 %
Bankruptcy Recovery Rate α = 0.6
Liquidity Cost k = 0.01
Liquidity Shock Intensity λ = 1.0
Current (date-0) Assets Value V = 100.0
Maturity T = 6.0
Coupon c = 6.12
Debt Principal p = 61.68
Price elasticity ψ = 0.11
Table 2.1
follows an inverse pattern: it first decreases with β and then starts to increase and has a
minimum around β = 20%. We will talk about these two extrema in subsection 2.4.5, as the
difference between them clearly shows agency cost.
Figure 2.6 examines the relationship between leverage, equity maximizing β∗ and default
boundary VB. I vary debt principal p and search for β
∗ that maximizes the equity value.
Coupon c is determined such that new debt is issued at par given p and β. Consistent
with empirical evidence, the model predicts that equity holders are more actively engaged in
debt buyback as leverage increases. Figure 2.6 shows that the proportion of debt repurchased
steadily increases from 4% to 8% as leverage rises. Figure 2.7 compares the default boundary
VB when equity holders choose to buy back debt in the proportion of β
∗ to the one when they
do not buy back at all. The conclusion is that strategic buyback always lowers the default
boundary and the effect is more salient as leverage increases. The relationship has important
implication on the firm’s optimal leverage. Early studies on firm’s optimal leverage mostly
focus on firm’s debt rollover without considering that the firm can also repurchase debt from
secondary market. The flexible debt buyback strategies imply that the firm can probably
employ more debt than what early models predicted.
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2.4.3 Liquidity and Debt Buyback
One feature of debt buyback is its countercyclicality: firms tend to buy back more debt
during recession. On the other hand, market liquidity is pro-cyclical(Eisfeldt (2004),Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen (2009),Næs, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011)). This implies that
market liquidity might impact equity holder’s choice on debt buyback. I formally explore
the relationship in this subsection.
Figure 2.8 shows how equity maximizing β∗ changes with market liquidity. 2.8a plots β∗
with respect to different liquidity shock intensity λ; 2.8b plots β∗ with respect to liquidity
cost k. They show that β∗ increases with both λ and k yet the rates are different: β∗ increases
much faster with k. Although higher λ and k both lower the market price of bonds, higher
k also lowers 1− k, the base of buyback price the firm has to pay and thus triggers the firm
to buy back more debt from secondary market.
As mentioned before, bonds buyback strategy can potentially increase the optimal leverage
of the firm. To see this, I compute the optimal leverage following Leland and Toft (1996).
I look for p∗ that maximizes equity value plus aggregate debt value, given the coupon such
that the new debt is issued at par, i.e.
max
p
E(p;V, VB) +D(p;V, VB)
s.t. d(V, T ;VB) = p
(2.31)
The market leverage is then defined as
D(p∗;V, VB)
E(p∗;V, VB) +D(p∗;V, VB)
(2.32)
Figure 2.9 plots the optimal leverage with respect to liquidity cost k for β = 0 and β = 4%.
In either case, the optimal leverage decreases with liquidity cost k. However, as expected,
97
the debt buyback strategy allows the firm to issue more debt and increases optimal leverage
as a result.
Not only market liquidity affects the equity holder’s choice on debt buyback, debt buyback
also alters the effect of liquidity risk on the firm. Liquidity risk, interacting with default risk,
determines the credit spread of a firm together with default risk. To better illustrate the
impact of debt buyback, I follow He and Xiong (2012) and compare responses of firms with
investment-grade A and speculative-grade BB and different buyback strategies to liquidity
shock represented by an increase in k. Specifically, A-rated firms have σ = .21 and k = 0.5%;
BB-rated firms have σ = .23 and κ = 1%. Other parameters are adopted from Table 3.2. .
For each type credit rating of firms, I consider two maturities: T = 6 and T = 10. Principal
p and coupon c are determined such that new bonds are issued at par with a credit spread of
100 bps for A-rated firms and with a credit spread of 330 bps for BB-rated firms, given that
the firm is not engaged in debt buyback for each maturity T , i.e. p and c are the solutions
to

d(V, T ;VB)|β=0 = p
c
y
(1− e−yT ) + pe−yT = p
where y is the bonds yield. I then let equity holders choose β∗ and see how credit spread
changes with β∗.
Table 2.2 shows the result. Debt buyback reduces the adverse effect of liquidity cost
increase on firm’s credit spread, compared to the case where firm does not buy back any
debt at all. The effect is much stronger for speculative-grade BB bonds than investment-
grade A bonds. However, the effect across different maturities (T=6 vs. T=10) is mixed
and does not show a clear pattern.
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Panel A: Investment-Grade A
k=0.5% k=1% k=2%
β = 0 β = β∗ β = 0 β = β∗ β = 0 β = β∗
Maturity Spread Spread 4 Spread 4 Spread Spread Spread 4 Spread 4 Spread Spread Spread 4 Spread 4 Spread
(Years) (bps) (bps) (bps) (fraction) (bps) (bps) (bps) (fraction) (bps) (bps) (bps) (fraction)
T=6 100 93.06 -6.94 -6.94% 155.35 146.17 -9.19 -5.91% 265.77 251.54 -14.23 -5.35%
T=10 100 93.38 -6.62 -6.62% 153.47 144.09 -9.38 -6.11% 259.49 244.96 -14.53 -5.60%
Panel B: Speculative-Grade BB
k=1% k=2% k=4%
β = 0 β = β∗ β = 0 β = β∗ β = 0 β = β∗
Maturity Spread Spread 4 Spread 4 Spread Spread Spread 4 Spread 4 Spread Spread Spread 4 Spread 4 Spread
(Years) (bps) (bps) (bps) (fraction) (bps) (bps) (bps) (fraction) (bps) (bps) (bps) (fraction)
T=6 330 305.13 -24.87 -7.54% 458.94 422.47 -36.47 -7.95% 700.58 640.46 -60.12 -8.58%
T=10 330 311.82 -18.18 -5.51% 449.61 413.61 -36.00 -8.01% 670.58 609.19 -61.39 -9.15%
Table 2.2
2.4.4 Mechanism
So far, we have seen that the results of the calibrated model are in line with the empirical
evidences. One might wonder the channel through which debt buyback strategy affects the
firm’s credit risk and values. In this subsection, we focus on two mechanisms: value transfer
from debt holders to equity holders and reduced debt overhang.
2.4.4.1 Value Transfer
In the model, equity holders decide to stop servicing the debt and liquidate the firm when the
assets value hits a boundary VB and the equity value becomes zero. However, when liquidity
cost is high, the market value of the debt is also very low. Buying back outstanding bonds
on the cheap therefore can transfer value from bondholders to equity holders and increase
equity value, compared to the case where the equity holders do not buy back any bonds at
all. The transferred value from debt holders thus incentivize the equity holders to bail out
the firm to a lower assets value. To see this, the value transferred from debt holders to equity




β κ(s) d(V, s;VB) ds (2.33)
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(2.33) uses the fact that κ′(s) = βκ(s). By buying back outstanding debt in the proportion of
β, equity holders have to pay φ(β)
∫ T
0
β κ(s) d(V, s;VB) ds but avoid the principal payment in
the amount of β p. Thus (2.33) represents the value transferred from debt holders to equity
holders.
Figure 2.10 shows the value transfer with respect to different buyback strategies β for
k = 0.01 and k = 0.012. It confirms the idea that buying back debt on the cheap transfers
value from debt holders to equity holders. Also, as liquidity cost k gets higher, an increase
in β will transfer more value in favor of equity holders, resulting in lower default boundary
VB. However, the buyback strategy and more value transfer does not overturn the adverse
effect of higher liquidity cost k on the firm’s default boundary and credit risk. Figure 2.11
plots default boundary VB with respect to liquidity cost k, with equity holders choosing β
∗.
It shows that VB still increases with liquidity cost k. Together, it explains the pattern we
have seen in Table 2.2: credit spread decreases when equity holders choose β = β∗ from
β = 0, given k; but increases with k.
2.4.4.2 Amplification: Reduced Overhang
Figure 2.5a shows the β∗ the equity holders would choose when k = 0.01, which is much
greater than the β maximizing value transferred from debt holders to equity holders. This
implies that there must be other amplification mechanism of the initial value transfer effect.
I will argue that the mechanism is reduced debt overhang effect.
Debt-overhang, stated formally in Myers (1977), refers to the fact that part of earnings
generated by potential new projects is appropriated by existing debt holders and reduces
equity holders’ incentive to invest on the projects. The effect is more salient when the firm is
under financial distress. Diamond and He (2014) also showed that a higher default threshold
is another form of debt overhang in the model with endogenous default boundary. Formal
modeling debt overhang requires to specify the firm’s production technology. Here I follow
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Diamond and He (2014) and use the sensitivity of market value of the new debt with respect




it measures how much assets value change accrues to debt holders.
Figure 2.12 plots debt overhang effect ∂d(V,T ;VB)
∂V
as well as endogenous default boundary
VB with respect to debt buyback proportion β. Both variables synchronize to decrease at
first and then increase with β. The synchronization reflects the fact that β only affects





























Proposition 1 indicates that given debt principal and bankruptcy cost are sufficiently
high, a lower default boundary reduces debt overhang. Suppose equity holders start from










> 0). The reduced overhang improves return of equity when assets value becomes
high in the future, which incentives equity holders to incur more cost and buy back more
debt. Reduced debt overhang amplifies the initial effect of value transfer of debt buyback.
In the end, β∗ is the optimal point where marginal cost of debt buyback equals its marginal
benefit from the perspective of equity holders.
2.4.5 Agency Cost on Debt Buyback
Hitherto, we have retained the assumption 1 that equity holders choose the debt buyback
strategy β. When equity holders make decisions, they do not take into account the external-
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ities of their decisions on debt holders , resulting conflict of interest between equity and debt
holders and agency cost. The two famous and well-studied problems on conflict of interest
are excessive risk taking (Jensen and Meckling (1976)) and debt overhang (Myers (1977)).
In this subsection, we show that agency cost also reflects on the deb buyback strategy and
equity maximizing β∗ deviates from what is optimal for the entire firm, i.e. equity value plus
aggregate debt value.
To gauge the agency cost, I consider equity maximizing β∗ and firm value maximizing β∗∗
for different principal p outstanding.
β∗ = arg max E(β; p, V )
β∗∗ = arg max {E(β; p, V ) +D(β; p, V )}
(2.36)
Figure 2.13 plots β∗ and β∗∗ as a function p. Interestingly, although equity holders max-
imizing β∗ deviates from β∗∗, the sign of the deviation depends on the leverage: when the
leverage is low, β∗∗ > β∗, meaning equity holders tend to under-buy-back the bonds com-
pared to what is optimal to the firm; when the leverage is high, β∗∗ < β∗ and they tend to
over-buy-back the bonds.
To further understand the economic reasons, I consider two specific cases where p =
80 (high leverage) and p = 45 (low leverage). Table 2.3 lists the buyback proportion β,
endogenous default boundary VB, equity value E, debt value D when equity holders choose
β∗ or firm chooses β∗∗ for each p, respectively. If there were no transaction cost, the firm
value would have equaled the asset value plus the value of tax benefits minus the value of
bankruptcy costs (Leland (1994b)). Or in other words,














− (E +D) (2.37)
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represents the deadweight loss that occurs during buyback and sales of bonds. This reflects
in the last row of Table 2.3.
When maximizing their security value, equity holders decide the endogenous default
boundary VB based on smooth-pasting condition (2.21) given β. Then equity holders choose
the pair (β, VB(β)) that yield the highest equity value. When leverage is low, the market
value of the debt and bonds buyback cost is high relative to the principal outstanding , and
thus the value transferred is limited. Therefore, equity holders only would like to buy back
a smaller proportion of bonds and choose a higher default boundary, compared to what is
optimal to the entire firm. Optimal firm buyback strategy β∗∗ requires equity holders to buy
more, as it reduces VB and increases debt value and the increased value exceeds the buyback
cost.
When leverage is high, the market value of the debt is low ceteris paribus and value
transferred to equity holders from buyback is high. Under such circumstance, equity holders
choose a higher β and lower default boundary VB, compared to what is optimal to the firm.
Nevertheless, most of the value eventually does not go to equity holders but is lost in the
transaction. A decrease in β therefore cuts the transaction cost and increase the firm value
overall.
2.4.6 Empirical Evidence
One implication of the model is that the firm should buy back more bonds when bonds
market liquidity dries up. In this section, we provide some empirical evidences. The evidences
serve to peep “the tip of the iceberg” and are no way in place of a rigorous empirical study.
Figure 2.14 plots the debt repurchase data from Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and liquidity
measure from Corwin and Schultz (2012) spanning from 2004 to 2010. Corwin and Schultz
(2012) developed a bid-ask spread estimator from bonds daily high and low prices and is one
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Agency Cost
VB Equity Debt DWL
p=80
β∗ = 0.118 60.241 29.269 71.846 3.368
β∗∗ = 0.111 60.371 29.264 71.858 3.307
4(β∗ → β∗∗) 0.13 -0.005 0.012 -0.061
p=45
β∗ = 0.022 37.807 61.809 50.087 4.937
β∗∗ = 0.055 37.491 61.734 50.241 4.913
4(β∗ → β∗∗) -0.316 -0.075 0.154 -0.024
Table 2.3
of the best performed bonds market liquidity proxies along with Roll (1984) and Hasbrouck
(2009) 3. It clearly shows that debt repurchase positively co-moves with illiquidity in the
bonds market, with correlation being 0.55. Debt repurchases reaches the peak around 2008-
2009 when the corporate bonds are highly discounted.
Nevertheless, in Jermann and Quadrini (2012) debt repurchase is defined as “the reduction
in outstanding debt (or increase if negative)” and measured by the negative of “net increase
in credit markets instruments of nonfinancial business” in the Flow of Funds accounts of the
Federal Reserve Board. This also includes the instances that firms halt new bonds issuance
when existing bonds mature. To better match the liquidity environment described in the
model to the reality, we focus on bonds tender offer within a window period from 2004 to
2005. The choice is based on two considerations. First, by considering bonds tender offer,
we focus on “clean” bonds buyback and rule out the cases where firms suspend issuing new
bonds when existing bonds mature. Second, In 2005 May 5th, bonds issued by GM and Ford
was downgraded by junk status by S&P. While the downgrade was expected by investors , the
timing still came as a shock to the bonds market (Acharya et al. (2014)). As a result, many
3 The three measures are highly correlated (Schestag, Schuster, and Uhrig-Homburg (2016)), so it is not
critical which measure to use.
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insurance companies, pension funds etc. were forced to liquidate the bonds holdings issued
by GM and Ford as regulations prevent them from holding junk-rated securities (Acharya,
Schaefer, and Zhang (2015)). This bonds market liquidity shock exactly captures what is
described in the model. And moreover, it occurs solely within the bonds market and rules
out confounding factors in other large scale economic or financial crisis (e.g. the Great
Recession) that could also possibly cause debt buyback.
We employ data of total tender amount and the number of bond issues tendered from Mer-
gent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). Figure 2.15a shows that the total amount of
bonds tender offers strongly and positively co-moves with illiquidity measures, both peaking
around May, 2005 when the bonds market liquidity shock occurs. The correlation is 0.07.
Figure 2.15b shows the number of bonds tender offers in 2004-2005, with the most tender
offers occurring in June, 2005.
A deeper analysis on bonds market liquidity, firm’s tender offer decision and tender offer
premium calls for data on market price of bonds. However, the data on market price of
bonds were sparse back in 2005. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) did
not report and publicize information on market transaction of bonds until July 1, 2002, and
at the beginning the reporting merely covered investment-grade bonds with initial issuance
size greater than 1 billion. The project started to cover 99% of the public transactions
beginning from Feburary 7, 2005. (Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011)). Furthermore, linking to
Compustat for firm’s characteristics results in even less observations. The data deficiency
makes it challenging to analyze the causal relationship between bonds market liquidity and




In this paper, we present a model to study bonds buyback, an important yet somehow
overlooked corporate finance strategy. Moreover, debt buyback is also a major macroeco-
nomic variable at an aggregate level. We focus on its link to the firm’s default risk and
market liquidity. Firms strategically choose how much debt to buy back and the decision
increases with market liquidity cost. The model shows that bonds buyback can help to
reduce the firm’s default risk and lessen the adverse effect of liquidity risk on the firm. The
reason lies in the fact that debt buyback transfers value from debt holders to equity holders
and incentivize equity holders to bail out the firm to a much lower assets level. The higher
liquidity cost is, the more the market price of debt is discounted and therefore more value
transferred to equity holders. In addition, the lower default boundary also reduces the debt
overhang effect and increase the return of equity.
There are two issues our model does not cover. First, the model does not leave room for
cash. When the firm buys back debt from secondary market, it is more likely that the firm
will use cash hoard. Imperfect capital market makes it costly to issue more equity. Especially,
as noted in Myers and Majluf (1984), if firm is short of cash and has to issue more equity to
finance, the firm will pass profitable opportunity with asymmetric information. Cash hoard
lessens firm’s reliance on equity issuance to raise capital. Second, as an assumption to derive
closed-form endogenous default boundary VB, the firm issues new debt and buys back old
debt such that the total outstanding principal remains the same. However, the firm usually
buys back debt as a way to deleverage. The deleverage has two countervailing effects. On
one hand, it reduces total debt outstanding, mitigates debt overhang to a much larger extent,
resulting a higher return of equity and lower default boundary; On the other hand, the value
transfer from bond holders to equity holders also decrease with leverage and it makes equity
holders to buy back less bonds. To analyze the roles of cash and leverage, a more delicate
and comprehensive model is needed. We leave these questions to future research.
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2.6 Proofs
2.6.1 Proof of Theorem 2
I take a guess-verify approach to solve the equity value E. Note that in He and Xiong (2012),
equity value E satisfies
rE = (r − δ)V EV +
σ2
2
V 2EV V + δV − (1− π)c+ κ(T )d(V, T ;VB)− κ(0)p︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗
(2.38)
In (2.18), the underlined part is
κ(T )d(V, T ;VB) +
∫ T ∗
0
(−κ′(s))d(V, s;VB)ds − κ(0)p− φ
∫ T
T ∗
κ′(s)d(V, s : VB)ds
Every part including the integral is a linear operator of d(V, ·;VB). Therefore, we conjecture
that equity value E satisfying (2.18) is given by



















































































































It is easy to verify the conjecture by plugging it into (2.18).
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Debt Repurchase and Credit Spread
B AA Debt Repurchase
Figure 2.1 Time series of debt repurchase and credit spread of BofA Merrill Lynch US cor-
porate AA and B firms. The debt repurchase data is from Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and
credit spread data are from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
Correlation Coefficients
Debt Repurchase B AA
Debt Repurchase 1
B 0.5870 1






















1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Debt Repurchase and Credit Spread
ALL OPEN TENDER AA B
Figure 2.2 Time series of open market repurchase, tender offers and credit spread of BofA
Merrill Lynch US corporate AA and B firms. Yearly data of open market repurchase and tender
offers are from Julio (2013). Credit spread data are from Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
Correlation Coefficients
OPEN TENDER AA B
OPEN 1.0000
TENDER -0.2057 1.0000
AA 0.2419 0.0405 1.0000
















Figure 2.4 Debt Buyback
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Figure 2.5 Equity Value E and Endogenous Default boundary VB when the firm buys back
different proportion (β) of outstanding bonds. The parameters are listed in 3.2.
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Figure 2.6 Equity maximizing β∗ for different principal outstanding p. The coupon c is
determined such that new debt is issued at par given p and β. The rest of the parameters are
listed in 3.2
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Figure 2.7 Default Boundary VB when equity holders optimally buy back debt (solid line)
compared to the one when equity holders do not buy back at all (dashed line).
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Figure 2.8 Equity maximizing β∗ for different liquidity shock frequency λ and bonds trans-
action cost k. The rest of the parameters are listed in 3.2.
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Figure 2.9 Optimal Leverage Ratio for different liquidity cost k when firms do not buy back
bonds at all (solid line) or buy back 4% annually (dashed line).
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Figure 2.10 Value transfer from debt holders to equity holders for different buyback strategy
β when bonds transaction cost k = 0.01 (solid line) and k = 0.012 (dashed line). The value
















Figure 2.11 Endogenous Default boundary VB as a function of liquidity shock cost k when
equity holders optimally buy back outstanding bonds.
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Figure 2.12 Endogenous Default boundary VB (dashed line, right axis )and debt overhang
∂d(V,T ;VB)
∂V (solid line, left axis) for different buyback strategy β.
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Figure 2.13 Equity maximizing β∗ (dashed line) and firm value maximzing β∗∗ (solid line) as




















2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Debt Repurchase and Bonds Market Liquidity
Illiquidity Debt Repurchase
Figure 2.14 Debt Repurchase from Jermann and Quadrini (2012) (dashed line, left axis) and





























Number of Bonds Tender Offers
Number of Bonds Tender Offers
(b)
Figure 2.15 Figure 2.15a shows liquidity measure from Corwin and Schultz (2012) (dashed
line, left axis) and the total amount of bonds tendered in 2004-2005 (solid line, right axis).
Figure 2.15b shows the number of bonds tender offers in 2004-2005.
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Chapter 3
How to Roll Over Debt? The Effect
of Risky Bond Yield Curve on
Optimal Rollover Strategy
3.1 Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis highlights the rollover risk in corporate debt management. Firms
commonly employ rollover policy: maturing bonds are paid off and replaced by issuing new
bonds. Nagler (2015) found that 13% of the outstanding bonds of a given S&P 500 firm
would be rolled over. He also found that the average amount of maturing bonds is $370
million and the average amount of new issuance is about $410 million, contingent upon a
firm is active in debt market. However, debt rollover subjects to risk, as it is difficult for
firms to issue new bonds when the firm’s assets value worsens or debt market freezes and
lacks liquidity. As a matter of fact, credit risk and market liquidity are two important factors
that determine corporate bonds credit spread. As He and Xiong (2012) points out, credit
risk and liquidity risk are intertwined together through debt rollover.
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Nevertheless, debt rollover itself still remains a black box and how to roll over debt is
largely unknown. Previous research usually relies on Leland and Toft (1996) to study debt
rollover and its impact on the yield curve of risky bonds (default-free yield curve plus term
structure of credit spread). In Leland and Toft (1996), firms follows what we dub “naive
rollover strategy”: firm issue new bonds of the same amount and maturity to replace the
maturing ones. Figure 3.1a shows the induced debt maturity profile when the firm naively
rolls over the bonds. The time-to-maturities of bonds are uniformly distributed on [0, T ]. In
other words, the proportion of bonds with time-to-maturity s over the entire outstanding
ones is 1
T
, ∀s ∈ [0, T ]. Figure 3.1b shows the naive rollover strategy. It is represented
by a Dirac delta function, since the firm only issues new bonds with maturity T and the
maturity bin has point mass across the entire maturity profile of new debt issuance. A natural
question would be if the naive rollover strategy is optimal then. If it is not, what factors
should the firm take into account when seeking an optimal rollover strategy, which assuages
the adverse effect of assets and liquidity shocks on the credit conditions and increases the
firm value overall? This is both a normative and positive question. In actual, the survey
done by Tufano and Servaes (2006) has listed several factors that CEOs deem important
in determining maturity structure of debt (See Table 3.1). They are also the important
factors that affect a firm’s rollover strategy, as debt rollover largely shapes a firm’s maturity
structure of debt. Among all the factors, risky bonds yield curve (including market depth)
is a major one, featuring the critical feedback channel of risky bonds yield curve on rollover
strategy decision.
Scant finance theory has studied these issues. In this paper, we use a dynamic model to
study how the firm exploits risky bonds yield curve1 to come close to an optimal rollover
strategy, highlighting the endogenous rollover strategy and risky bonds yield curve as well
1 The risky bond yield curve can be decomposed into treasury yield curve plus the term structure of
credit spread. As can be seen in Section 3.2, the model fixes risk-free rate r constant and thus assumes a
flat default-free yield curve. Therefore, the curvature, level and sensitivity of the risky bond yield curve are
entirely driven by the term structure of the credit spread.
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as their interaction. Our model is similar to Leland and Toft (1996) and both generate risky
bonds yield curve endogenously. In the model, the firm’s assets are exogenous and follow a
geometric Brownian motion. Each instant the firm issues new bonds to pay off the maturing
bonds and maintains a stationary debt structure. Depending on the firm’s current assets and
debt market liquidity, debt rollover may result in capital gain or loss which equity holders
have to assume. Any gain would be paid out to equity holders right away and any loss would
be paid off by equity holders’ new contribution. The firm will service the debt until assets
value reaches a threshold upon which equity value becomes zero and equity holders choose
to default. Notwithstanding, unlike early literature on debt maturity accentuating rollover
frequency, our model shuts down rollover frequency channel and focuses on the feedback
channel of risky bond yield curve on rollover strategy.
Our analysis consists of two parts and focuses on the risky bonds yield level, sensitivity and
its curvature. First, we argue that the firm can disperse maturity dates of newly issued debt
when the risky bonds yield curve is concave. When the risky bonds yield curve is concave,
the market value of the bonds is convex to the time-to-maturities. Dispersing the maturity
dates of new issuance therefore bring in more proceeds than otherwise, incentivizing equity
holders to lower the default boundary and mitigating the adverse effects of assets value and
market liquidity shocks on firm’s credit conditions. The mitigation effect depends on the
curvature of the current risky bond yield curve, and is strong when the curve is normal,
i.e. concave upward sloping. We provide a general sufficient condition for the curve to
be (locally) concave. Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner (2014) empirically documented that
corporate bonds maturity profile displays dispersion. A more relevant fact to our model,
found by Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2016), is that firm’s incremental bond maturity
choice also displays dispersion. In other words, firms issue bonds of various maturities to
replace the maturing ones. Both empirical papers argue the reason is to mitigate maturity
concentrations. While this is true, our paper implies another undocumented and testable
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mechanism: firms are more likely to disperse the maturity dates of new issuances when the
current risky bonds yield curve is concave.
Second, we argue that a better rollover strategy weighs the level against the sensitivity of
the risky bonds yield curve. When debt is rolled over, the newly issued debt would cause the
current market yield to change and the magnitude of the change echoes “ market depth” in
market micro-structure literature. For example, the risky bond yield of some maturity is low
but might be highly sensitive to any new bonds issued in the maturity bin, and thus it is not
clear whether newly issued bonds in that maturity bin would raise more money than others.
Our model shows that when the firm switches from naive rollover to issuing new bonds based
on trade-off between yield and market depth, equity holders would like to choose a lower
default boundary. This is not surprising, as the better rollover strategy exploits the risky
bonds yield curve and brings in more proceeds than naive rollover, reducing the amount of
new contribution needed from equity holders. Therefore, a rollover strategy based on trade-
off between risky bonds yield and market depth would also lessen the adverse effect of assets
and market liquidity shocks on firm’s credit conditions.
Our calibration exercise is composed of “local” and “global” versions. The “local” cal-
ibration exercise takes the naive rollover and engendered debt profile as benchmark and
numerically examines the effect of slight (local) perturbation from naive rollover and issuing
new bonds based upon exploiting the risky bonds yield curve on the default boundary and
firm value; Based on the result of local calibration, the “global” calibration proposes a new
rollover strategy to take advantage of the risky bonds yield curve and compare it to the
naive rollover. The calibration exercises try to reconcile model tractability and sophisti-
cated rollover strategies employed by firms. Admittedly, a comprehensive characterization
of rollover strategy would entail firm’s dynamic adjustment of debt maturity profile and
leverage as well as taking account of the debt maturity profile inertia caused by frictions.
However, such a model would be highly intractable and lose intuitive appeals.
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It is helpful to compare our model to Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani
(1961) and recognize the economic forces that are working. Modigliani-Miller theorem states
that the capital structure and financial policies, such as rollover strategy and debt maturity
arrangement, do not affect the value of a firm in an efficient market in the absence of taxes,
bankruptcy and agency cost. Our model is in alignment with tradeoff theory and features
debt tax benefits, bankruptcy cost as well as market illiquidity cost. Among the three of
them, bankruptcy cost plays the essential role in our model. A better rollover strategy would
help to enhance the firm value because it reduces the amount of new contribution from equity
holders, incentivizing them to choose a lower endogenous default boundary and leading to a
smaller bankruptcy cost and higher firm value overall.
Our model fills the gap between practice and finance theory and contributes to a large
strand literature on corporate finance and debt maturity. As aforementioned, practitioners
take many factors into consideration when rolling over debt, especially the risky bonds yield
curve. Yet, finance theory has mainly focused the factor of rollover frequency and the
unidirectional effect of rollover strategy on the risky bonds yield curve. So far as we know,
our paper is the first one to discuss the feedback effect of risky bonds yield curve, including
its level, curvature and sensitivity, on the rollover strategy. Furthermore, there have been
extensive literature on the firm’s decision on debt maturity. Among those, He and Xiong
(2012) discussed the credit condition exacerbation caused by frequent rollover of short-term
bonds when market liquidity dries up. Acharya, Gale, and Yorulmazer (2011) shows that
frequent rollover causes the sudden freeze in the accessibility of secured short-term debt. He
and Milbradt (2016) analyzed the dynamic debt maturity choice made by firms based on
the framework Leland (1994a) and Leland (1998). These works focused on the dichotomy
trade-off between short-term and long-term debt but did not account for the whole debt
maturity profile. Our paper, bridging Leland and Toft (1996) and Leland (1994a), studies
rollover strategy and ensued debt maturity profile.
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The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we provide a general
model to study bonds rollover and bridge Leland and Toft (1996) and Leland (1994a). We
show that the major distinction is that our model shuts down the rollover frequency channel.
In other words, it fixes the amount of debt maturing each instant. In Section 3.3, we apply
the model to study rollover strategy, debt maturities dispersion and curvature of the risky
bonds yield curve; In Section 3.4, we apply the model to study the effect of yield level and
sensitivity in shaping a better rollover strategy; Section 3.5 concludes. All supplementary
proofs are in the appendix.
3.2 A General Model of Debt Rollover
3.2.1 Firm and Asset
The unlevered value of a firm’s assets, V , follows a geometric Brownian motion given by
dV
V
= (r − δ) dt+ σ dz
where {zt} is a standard Brownian motion. r is the risk-free interest rate; δ is the payout
rate to equity holders; σ is the volatility of assets value; r, δ, σ are constants.
3.2.2 Debt Structure
The stationary debt structures from Leland and Toft (1996) and Leland (1998) are the most
often cited structural frameworks for studying credit risk, corporate debt issues and debt
maturity. These two frameworks assume that the firm is committed to maintaining a station-
ary debt structure. When an issue of debt matures, the firm “naively replaces it by issuing
another debt with the same maturity. Leland and Toft (1996) assumes a flat, uniform debt
distribution, implying that a constant amount of outstanding debt is retired and replaced
each instant. The time-to-maturity of the bonds is uniformly distributed between today,
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time 0, and time T . In other words, ∀s ∈ [0, T ], an amount of 1
T
of bonds will mature in s
periods. At each instant, the firm issues new bonds maturing in T periods with the same
amount of principal as the retired ones. (See Figure (3.1a)). Leland (1998) assumes that
debt matures in an I.I.D random Poisson shock fashion, implying that a constant proportion
of outstanding debt is retired and replaced; all bonds mature stochastically following an
exponential distribution with mean 1
θ
. At each instant, a proportion θ dt of bonds matures,
and to replace them the firm issues new bonds of the same amount of principal with the
same stochastic maturity.
We provide a more general model of debt rollover and argue that these two frameworks
can be integrated, depending on how the firm rolls over its maturing debt. When some bonds
mature, firms do not necessarily issue new bonds with the same amount of principal and
maturity to replace them. On the contrary, to replace maturing bonds firms can issue several
new bonds with different amounts of principal and periods of maturity (See Figure (3.2)).
In fact, Norden, Roosenboom, and Wang (2016) empirically corroborates that many firms
frequently issued bonds of multiple maturities at the same time and maintain a dispersed
debt maturity structure consequently.
Suppose the firm has 1 unit of outstanding debt in total and that its maturities are
distributed on [0, T ]. All units of outstanding bonds are assumed to be of equal seniority.
Since the total outstanding debt is 1, I use the probability density function κt(s) to represent




Let Kt(s) be the corresponding cumulative distribution function. I assume κ′t(s) < 0, ∀s.
The firm commits to a stationary debt structure. Starting from date t, after 4t periods, a
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stationary debt structure implies
κt+4t(s) = κt(s),∀ 0 ≤ s ≤ T, (3.1)
That is, the firm always has the same amount of bonds with the same time-to-maturity,
















That is, the bonds that have matured before date 4t must be spread over among the bonds
maturing in the future.




















−κ′t(s) ds+ κt(T ) (3.5)
or equivalently, ∫ T
0
−κ′t(s) ds = κt(T )− κt(0) (3.6)
where κ′t(s) is the derivative of the density function.
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Equation (3.5) (or (3.6)) is in essence the first fundamental theorem of calculus, and
implies that to keep debt structure stationary, maturing bonds are rolled over following a
particular fashion. Specifically, for any time-to-maturity s ∈ (0, T ), the amount of bonds
has to increase by −κ′0(s). Recall κ′0(s) ≤ 0 by assumption, so the firm does not need to buy
back any outstanding bonds. The greater −κ′0(s) is, the more the firm issues new bonds with
time-to-maturity s to replace bonds that have just matured. Also, the firm has to issue new
bonds with maturity T in the amount of κt(T ) to maintain a stationary debt structure. Since
κt(s) does not explicitly depend on t, I drop the subscript t and refer to κ(s) henceforward.















1{0≤s<T} ∨ κ(T )κ(0)1{s=T}
}
is another probability density func-
tion and continuous almost everywhere 2. Note that Φ(s) is independent of κ(0), i.e. the
amount of maturing debt each instant, allowing us to fix κ(0) and focus on the way the
firm issues new debt. It effectively shuts down the rollover frequency channel of different
maturities of debt and distinguishes us from previous literature on rollover risk and debt
maturity. In those literature, higher rollover frequency is equivalent to larger amount of ma-
turing debt each instant. Therefore, I interpret Φ(s) as the way the firm rolls over a single
unit of maturing bonds and use EΦ(s)[·] to denote the expectation with respect to probability
density Φ(s). The first two moments can be calculated easily.
Lemma 1. Let T̄ = Eκ(s)[s] =
∫ T
0
sκ(s) ds, i.e. T̄ is the average maturity of the current
















Below I demonstrate how I establish a bridge between Leland (1998) and Leland and Toft
(1996) by letting κ(s) = θe−θs. The framework more accurately reflects actual firm behaviors
in debt maturity management and so provides a valuable basis for reasoning about optimal
rollover strategy and debt maturity structure.
3.2.3 Debt Valuation
We follow He and Xiong (2012) and assume that the bondholders subject to a Poisson
liquidity shock arriving with intensity λ. Upon arrival of the liquidity shock, the bondholders
have to liquidate all his portfolio right away at a fractional cost of k. k models the availability
of liquidity in the bonds market.
Consider a single bond maturing in t periods from the present that continuously pays a
constant coupon flow c and has principal p. Let α be the fraction of asset value VB the debt
receives in the event of bankruptcy. Let d(V ;VB, t) be the market value of the debt and it
satisfies
r d(V ;VB , s) = c︸︷︷︸
1
−λ k d(V ;VB , s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
2




∂d(V ;VB , s)
∂V
(r − δ)V + 1
2
∂2d(V ;VB , s)
∂V 2
σ2V 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
4
(3.10)
The right side of (3.10) is the required return of holding bonds by investors; Part 1 on the
left is the coupon received by the bondholders; Part 2 is the fractional cost incurred upon
liquidation of the bond portfolios; Part 3 accounts for the bond value change caused by
shortened time-to-maturity; The last part is the bond value change caused by underlying
assets value fluctuation. To solve the partial differential equation (P.D.E), we need two
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additional boundary conditions, corresponding to whether the firm declares bankruptcy or
not before the debt matures. If the firm is able to repay the principal when the debt matures,
the bond investors will claim p, i.e.
d(V ;VB, 0) = p,∀V ≥ VB (3.11)
Otherwise, if the firm defaults before the bonds mature, the bond investors can only claim
αVB since all units of debt are of equal seniority, i.e.
d(VB;VB, s) = αVB,∀s ∈ [0, T ] (3.12)
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κ(s) d(V ;VB, s) ds (3.19)
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3.2.4 Equity Valuation
Analogous to debt valuation in last section, equity value E satisfies the following differential
equation
rE = (r − δ)V EV +
σ2
2




− (1− π)c︸ ︷︷ ︸
3
+
κ(T )d(V ;VB, T ) +
∫ T
0
−κ′(s)d(V ;VB, s) ds− κ(0)p︸ ︷︷ ︸
∗
(3.20)
The right side of (3.20) is the required return of equity holders; (1) on the left is the equity
value change due to underlying assets value fluctuation; (2) is the assets payout to equity
holders; (3) is the coupon payment plus tax benefits; (*) denotes the difference between the
market value of newly issued bonds and the principal due. Clearly, it is closely related to
how the firm rolls over the maturing debt. The (*) part which we dub “rollover term” can
also be rewritten as
















EΦ(s)[d(V ;VB, s)]− p
)
(3.22)
(3.22) is the rollover gain/loss for one unit of debt outstanding times the total amount
of principal due.
The equity value E is solved in closed-form in Xu (2016).The endogenous default boundary
VB can be solved from smooth-pasting condition
EV |V=VB = 0 (3.23)
and is given in Theorem 3.
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(b (−a, s) + b (a, s)) + c
r + λk






































η = z − a, a =









a2σ4 + 2(r + λ k)σ2
σ2
(3.29)
3.2.5 Connection to Leland(1994b, 1998)
The exponential distribution, the p.d.f for which is expressed as θe−θs, is one of the distri-
bution satisfying the assumption that its first order derivative is non-positive. By letting
κ(s) = θe−θs, I formally show (3.24) in theorem 3 can be reduce to Leland (1994b, 1998).
Corollary 1. By letting T →∞, λ→ 0 and κ(s) = θe−θs, the endogenous default threshold
and firm value reduce to Leland (1994b, 1998)
3.3 Yield Curve and Maturity Dispersion
In this section, we apply the general model of rollover strategy and analyze a new factor that
drives the firm to disperse maturity dates when issuing new debt. Firms disperse maturity
dates to exploit the curvature of the current term structure of the credit spread. When the
term structure of credit spread is concave, the firm is able to raise more money from debt
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market by dispersing maturity dates, lessening the repayment pressure on equity holders
and incentivizing them to choose a lower default boundary. To study the question, we need
to be able to characterize κ(t) in general, instead of assuming specific function form. To
get around the technical difficulty, we employ Taylor expansion to analyze the expectation
EΦ(s)[·] under the probability density function Φ(s).
To see this, we reexamine the equation (3.22)
R (Φ(s)) = κ(0)
(



















































The last line of (3.31) uses the result of Lemma 1 that EΦ(s) = 1κ(0) . (3.31) reduces to Leland
and Toft (1996) and He and Xiong (2012) when κ(0) = 1
T




, i.e. when the
firm “naively” rolls over the maturing debt by issuing new debt with the same maturity T .
When κ(s) = 1
T
,∀s ∈ [0, T ], the firm only issues new debt with maturity T to refinance the
maturing ones and the dispersion part is missing as V arΦ(s) = 0.
Before we proceed to derive the endogenous default boundary V̄B under the approximation,
we would like to first look at the economic intuition behind the “dispersion” term. Let y























































Part (1) is bond’s convexity; Part (3) is bond’s duration; Part (4) represents the curvature
of the bond’s yield curve; Part (2) is the square of the slope of bond’s yield curve. We have
(1) > 0, (2) > 0, (3) < 0 (3.33)
Only (4)’s sign is uncertain. For a normal yield curve, the curve is usually concave upward
sloping and (4) < 0; For a inverted yield curve, the curve is usually convex downward sloping.
Due to the nature of approximation, we shall interpret (3.31) in a local fashion. Given the
firm rolls over debt in a naive way and issues new debt with maturity T , if the current yield
curve is concave at T , dispersing maturities of new bonds around T therefore exploits the
curvature of the yield curve and brings in more proceeds than otherwise (See Figure 3.3).
Furthermore, although Lemma 1 characterizes V arΦ(s) and associates it with the average
maturity of the current outstanding bonds T̄ , we shall restrict V arΦ(s) to small magnitude
in the calibration for a more accurate approximation.
A natural question is when the yield curve is concave around T . Proposition 1 provides
a sufficient condition for bond value to be convex with respect to time-to-maturity. It says
that given debt principal outstanding and bankruptcy cost is sufficiently high, bond value
d(V, s;VB) is convex with respect to time-to-maturity s as long as s is sufficiently long. Based
on the aforementioned analysis, it also provides a sufficient condition for term structure of
credit spread to be locally concave.
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Corollary 2 gives the default boundary V̄B under the approximation.









































To put the model into work, we adopt the parameters from existing literature. Table 3.2
shows the parameters values used in calibration. The annual proportion of outstanding bonds
maturing, κ(0), is a new parameter in our model. We set κ(0) = 1
6
= 0.17, corresponding
to T = 6 in Leland and Toft (1996). It is also close to the estimate 13% found by Nagler
(2015).
3.3.2 Maturities Dispersion
In this subsection, we first consider “local” comparative statics. In other words, instead
of assuming any specific rollover strategy, we will rely on equation (3.34) and consider the
effect of “locally” dispersing maturities of newly issued debt around T on endogenous default
boundary VB, restricting V arΦ(s) to small magnitude in (3.34). Under such circumstance,
T = 1
κ(0)
and as a consequence, the proportion of debt maturing each instant decreases with
T . Next, we will consider a “global” variation and propose a new specific rollover strategy
to exploit the curvature of the yield curve. In this way, we are able to fix κ(0).




when V ARΦ(s) = 0 and V ARΦ(s) = 1 in (3.34), respectively. As we can see, a local debt
138
maturities dispersion does help to decrease the default boundary and the effect is more
salient when the entire debt profile is short, i.e. T is small. Figure 3.4b provides the answer.
Figure 3.4b plots the difference between VB and V̄B as well as local curvature at T . The
concavity slowly decreases as the maturity of newly issued debt becomes longer. As a result,
the marginal impact of local dispersion on the default boundary also diminishes.
The approximating nature of Taylor expansion in (3.31) destines that (3.34) is only accu-
rate when V ARΦ(s) is small. To obtain a better characterization of VB when newly issued
bonds display dispersion around T to a larger degree, we consider a specific class of debt
maturity profiles and rollover strategies. In particular, we fixed T = 6 and κ(0) = 0.17
and disperse the maturities of new bonds symmetrically around T , ranging from T −4t to
T +4t. Figure 3.5 depicts the rollover strategy. The rollover strategy is consistent to the
interpretation of (3.34) and more importantly, it shuts down the rollover frequency channel
by fixing κ(0) and highlights the dispersion effect.
Figure 3.6a and 3.6b show term structure of credit spread and market value of bonds with
respect to time-to-maturities when the default boundary VB is determined by naive rollover
strategy. Consistent with Proposition 1, the bonds value (credit spread) is concave (convex)
with respect to time-to-maturity s for s > 2. We are interested in how dispersion measured
by 4t affects default boundary VB. Figure 3.7 plots the relationship between 4t and VB
and shows that VB decreases with 4t. The result not only depends on the local concavity
of d(V ;VB, s) at T but also depends on the its global concavity on [T −4t, T +4].
As mentioned earlier and attested by (3.34), dispersing the maturities of newly issued
bonds can take advantage of the curvature of the term structure of credit spread and increase
the proceeds from new debt issuance. Fixing κ(0), maturities dispersion increases (3.30) and
lessens the repayment burden on equity holders, incentivizing them to choose a lower VB.
This explains the relationship between VB and maturity dispersion measure the calibrated
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model displays so far.
For the same reason, dispersing maturities and taking advantage of the curvature of term
structure of credit spread can also dampen the adverse effect of liquidity shock. Fig 3.8 shows
VB for different liquidity cost k when the firm disperses the maturities of new issuance of
bonds and does not. It confirms that dispersing the maturity dates can decrease the default
boundary chosen by equity holders and reduces the firm’s credit risk. The numerical example
also shows that the attenuating effect of maturity dates dispersion on default boundary
increases with liquidity cost.
3.4 Rollover, Yield Curve and Market Depth
When issuing new bonds to refinance the maturing ones, bonds price of different maturities
have disparate sensitivities to the new issuance. For example, a low yield bond might be
highly sensitive to any new bonds to the maturity bin. The sensitivity or bonds market depth
is “Wall Street’s way of talking about a market’s ability to handle large trades without big
moves in prices” 3. Therefore, when firm issues new bonds, it has to trade off the yield and
market depth of bonds for different maturities.
To see this more clearly, recall the rollover term (3.22)
R(Φ(s)) = κ(0)
(




Φ(T )d(V ;VB, T ) +
∫ T
0



















Φ(s) ds = 1 (3.37)
3 Bloomberg, ”The Treasury Market’s Legendary Liquidity Has Been Drying Up”
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= d(V ;VB , s)− d(V ;VB , T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ Φ(s)
∂d(V ;VB , s)
∂Φ(s)
+ Φ(T )




= d(V ;VB , s)− d(V ;VB , T )︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ Φ(s)











(3.38) shows the effect of slightly shifting the amount of new debt issuance with maturity T
to the one with maturity s < T on rollover term R(Φ(s)). It consists of two parts. Term (1)
is the direct effect and shows the difference in proceeds raised between bonds of maturity s
and T . In other words, it represents the difference in the level of the yields associated with
the two maturities; Term (2) accounts for the indirect effect and is the impact of the shift on
the proceeds raised from the rest of new debt issuance with maturity s and T . For example,
suppose the yield of bonds with time-to-maturity s is slightly lower than the ones with
time-to-maturity T , it seems that issuing new bonds on maturity s instead of on maturity
T would boost up the rollover term R(Φ(s)) ; however, if the market of bonds d(V ;VB, s) is
not deep in the sense that a new issuance on maturity s would increase the yield to a larger
extent, the indirect effect will dominate the direct effect and the firm would be better off
not using new issuance of bonds with maturity s to replace the ones with maturity T . The
term (2) tallies with the definition of market depth in market micro-structure literature and
therefore we dub (2) “market depth effect”. It essentially measures the sensitivity of current
yield to new debt issuance for a particular maturity. (3.39) reveals the nature that drives
the market depth effect: the heterogeneous response of endogenous default boundary VB to
new debt issuance for different maturities.
(3.39) implies two factors that affect the depth of bonds market: the sensitivity of bonds
value with respect to the default boundary VB and the sensitivity of default boundary VB
with respect to Φ(s), the proportion of bonds with time-to-maturity s among all newly issued
bonds. We first study the sensitivity of debt market value d(V ;VB, s) to default boundary
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VB. Proposition 2 characterizes
∂d(V ;VB ,s)
∂VB
under general conditions. It says that given debt
principal and bankruptcy cost sufficiently high, a higher default boundary will lower the
market value of the debt as long as the time-to-maturity is sufficiently long.
Proposition 2. Suppose p ≥ c
r+ξk









, then ∂d(V ;VB ,s)
∂VB
< 0
The current debt maturity profile inevitably affects the marginal effect of Φ(s) on default
boundary VB. Therefore, to characterize
∂VB
∂Φ(s)
, we have to set the benchmark debt maturity
profile. As we are interested in whether the naive debt rollover is optimal, we set the debt
maturity profile stemming from the naive rollover strategy as the benchmark, i.e. the one in
Figure 3.1a. Proposition 3 characterizes ∂VB
∂Φ(s)
under such circumstance.








and the firm currently rolls











Proposition 3 says that, given debt principal and bankruptcy cost sufficiently high, naive
debt rollover strategy is not optimal. Fixing the amount of debt maturing each instant
constant, increase the use of short-term bonds in debt rollover can decrease the default
boundary VB. Moreover, the effect of decreasing the default boundary and improving credit
condition is stronger when the maturity of newly issued bonds is shorter. As can be seen
in the calibrated model below, when the firm naively rolls over the debt, the market of
short-term bonds is “deep” and yield is low.
Model Calibration
In this subsection, we calibrate the model using the parameters from Table 3.2. Our cali-
bration exercise again has “local” and “global” two versions. In the local version, we will








and explore their relationships. In the global version, based on our
aforementioned analysis, we will come up with a specific rollover strategy and debt maturity
profile and see how targeting on yield curve and market depth can help firm to manage credit
risk and liquidity risk.
Figure 3.9 shows the sensitivity of VB to Φ(s), the proportion of newly issued debt with
time-to-maturity s, given the amount of debt maturing each instant κ(0), when the firm
currently rolls over the debt naively. Clearly, issuing short-term bonds slightly more reduces
default boundary VB and the effect becomes stronger as the time-to-maturity of debt is
shorter. When the firm rolls over the debt naively, the firm does not fully exploit the term
structure of credit spread and overlooks many favorable factors, including the difference





, the sensitivity of rollover term R(Φ(s)) with respect to the proportion function
Φ(s). Consistent with the evidence on ∂VB
∂Φ(s)
, issuing short-term bonds slight more increases
the rollover term and the effect is stronger as the time-to-maturity of debt considered, s, is
shorter. The rise on the rollover term lessens the amount of new contribution from equity
holders, if any, and therefore let them willing to bail out the firm to a lower assets level.
The local calibration implies that issuing more short-term bonds lowers the default bound-
ary, given the amount of debt maturing each instant. Therefore, we consider a specific rollover
strategy featuring new issuance of short-term bonds. We consider a rollover strategy and
debt profile illustrated in Figure 3.10. We fix κ(0) = 1
6
= 0.17. Each instant the firm has to
repay debt principal in the amount of κ(0) p and issues new bonds with maturities between
0 and 2 years as well as T years. To facilitate our discussion, we assume that the firm issues
the same amount of bonds with maturity between 0 and 2 years, i.e. −κ′(s) = ε,∀s ∈ [0, 2] ,
where ε is the amount of bonds issued with maturity s. We aim at studying the relationship
between VB and ε. To keep κ(0) still, we have to innocuously lengthen T so that Φ(s) is
integrated to 1 as a probability density function. Figure 3.11 shows the default boundary VB
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with respect to ε. As the firm issues more short-term bonds, equity holders are more willing
to bail out the firm to a lower assets value.
Therefore, for the same reason, we conjecture that the same rollover strategy can assuage
the adverse effect of liquidity shock on the firm. Figure 3.12 shows VB for different liquidation
cost k and the amount of new short-term bonds issuance ε. As the firm issues more short-term
bonds to refinance the maturing debt, the default boundary VB becomes lower. Moreover,
the effect is more conspicuous when the liquidation cost is higher. Higher liquidation cost
would raise the bonds yield and coerce equity holders to contribute more capital to pay off
the maturing debt, pushing up the default boundary quickly if the firm simply rolls over the
debt naively; as a consequence, taking advantage of the yield curve and strategical rollover
greatly helps to manage credit risk and liquidity risk.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study if the naive debt rollover in Leland and Toft (1996) is optimal and
explore the strategies that the firm could take to exploit the yield curve, including its level,
sensitivity as well as curvature, when rolling over debt, accentuating the endogenous rollover
strategies and yield curve as well as their interaction. Debt rollover plays a very important
role in corporate finance and has substantial impact on firm’s credit risk and liquidity risk.
To study the question, we propose a model of debt rollover in general, bridging Leland
and Toft (1996) and Leland (1998), Leland (1994a). The model is able to fix the amount
of bonds maturing each instant and thus shut down the rollover frequency channel, which
distinguishes us from early literature on debt maturity. In addition, our model accounts for
the corporate debt maturity profile , instead of focusing on dichotomy of short-term and
long-term bonds.
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Our model shows that the firm can disperse the maturity dates of new debt issuance
when the yield curve is concave with respect to time-to-maturity, taking advantage of the
curvature of the yield curve; the firm should also weigh the yield level against its sensitivity
when issuing new debt, ideally targeting maturity bins with low yield and deep market. This
shows that the firm can do better than simply rolling over debt naively. Taking advantage
of the yield curve would lower the amount of new contribution from equity holders, if any,
and incentivize them to choose a lower default boundary, leading to a lower bankruptcy
cost and higher firm value. For the same reason, a better rollover strategy exploiting yield
curve is able to assuage the adverse effect of assets and liquidity shocks on the firm’s credit
conditions.
Like most Leland-type models, our model also assumes firm’s commitment on leverage
and debt maturity structure to keep the model tractable and a constant endogenous default
boundary VB . In practice, firms do change leverage (Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2013),Gold-
stein, Ju, and Leland (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Titman and
Tsyplakov (2007), Hennessy and Whited (2005)) and debt maturity structure (Chen, Xu,
and Yang (2012), Xu (2014)). Recently, some progress are made to relax the assumptions.
For example, DeMarzo and He (2014) allows the firm to dynamically adjust the leverage
while He and Milbradt (2016) allows the firm to dynamically adjust the debt maturity. How
dynamic adjustment on leverage and debt maturity profile affects rollover strategy and yield
curve is unknown and we leave it to future research.
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3.6 Proofs
3.6.1 Proof of Lemma 1
























where (3.42) is from integration by parts and (3.43) is by definition of probability density
function.
Similarly, we have


































the average maturity of existing debt structure.
3.6.2 Proof of Theorem 3
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η = z − a, a =









a2σ4 + 2(r + λ k)σ2
σ2
(3.53)






η−1 + ακ(0)EΦ(s)[B(−u, s) +B(u, s)]
(3.54)
3.6.3 Proof of Corollary 1
We will mainly discuss endogenous default threshold VB. Other variables including firm
value, equity value and debt value can be derived in a similar way.








































































































1 + αy + (1− α)ỹ
, where ỹ =




(r − δ − σ2
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Factors Determining Maturity Structure of Debt 4
Factors % 4 or 55 N 6
Mitigate maturity concentrations 48% 217
Assets and liabilities matching 33% 212
Market Depth 33% 209
Expected slope of the yield curve7 30% 208
Current slope of the yield curve 29% 210
Absolute credit spreads 24% 209
Current versus expected credit risk 19% 207
Credit Spreads relative to history 16% 208
Evaluated on the total interest paid 14% 216
Long-term debt riskier projects 12% 203
Mispricing of debt 12% 208
Evaluated on the interest volatility 8% 215
Other companies in industry 7% 203
Table 3.1
4 The Table is from Tufano and Servaes (2006).
5 The survey asked CEO “How important are the following factors in deciding on the maturity structure
of your debt?” The answer can range from “Not important (0) ” to “Very important (5) ”
6 N: The number of correspondents




Debt Tax Benefit Rate π = 0.27
Assets Volatility σ = 0.23
Interest Rate r = 8.0 %
Payout Rate δ = 2.0 %
Bankruptcy Recovery Rate α = 0.6
Liquidity Cost k = 0.01
Liquidity Shock Intensity λ = 1.0
Current (date-0) Assets Value V = 100.0
Coupon c = 6.22
Debt Principal p = 61.68
Principal Proportion Due κ(0) = 0.17
Table 3.2
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(a) Debt Profile in Leland and Toft (1996). The horizontal
axis indicates time-to-maturity of outstanding bonds; The
vertical axis indicates the proportion of bonds of each time-







































(b) Debt Rollver in Leland and Toft (1996). The horizontal
axis indicates new debt maturity; The vertical axis indicates
the proportion of new bonds of each maturity over the entire
new issuance. In Leland and Toft (1996), it is a Dirac Delta
function.
Figure 3.1 Debt profile and rollover strategy in Leland and Toft (1996).
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Figure 3.3 Local dispersion around T when debt is rolled over
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Figure 3.4 Figure 3.4a shows the default boundary VB when V ARΦ(s) = 0, i.e. no dispersion
(solid line) and the default boundary V̄B when V ARΦ(s) = 1 (dashed line), as functions of
the amount of principal maturing κ(0) each instant. Figure 3.4b plots VB − V̄B, the difference
between VB and V̄B (solid line and left axis) and
∂2d(V,s;VB)
∂s2
|s=T , i.e. the local concavity of













Figure 3.5 Debt maturity profile and rollover strategy when the firm exploits the curvature
of yield curve for maturities in [T −4t, T +4t]. When debt is rolled over, the firm would issue
the same amount of new bonds with maturities in [T −4t, T +4t].
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(a) Bonds Yield Curve (Term structure of credit spread)


















(b) Bonds Market Value with respect to timet-to-maturity
Figure 3.6 Bonds Yield Curve and Market Value. All parameters follow Table 3.2 .
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Figure 3.7 Endogenous default boundary VB when the firm naively rolls over the debt (no
dispersion); Endogenous default boundary VB as a function of 4t (dashed line, left axis), when
the firm follows the debt maturity profile and rollover strategy illustrated in Figure 3.5; Firm
value, D + E, as a function of 4t (dot-dashed line, right axis). All other parameters follow
Table 3.2.
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Figure 3.8 The endogenous default boundary as a function of liquidity cost k when the firm
naively rolls over the debt, i.e. no dispersion (solid line) and disperses the maturity dates of
new bonds (dashed line).
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Figure 3.9 The sensitivity of endogenous default boundary VB with respect to Φ(s), the
proportion of bonds with time-to-maturity s among all newly issued bonds (solid line, left
axis); The sensitivity of rollover term R (Φ(s)) with respect to Φ(s) (dashed line, right axis).
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Figure 3.10 Debt maturity profile and rollover strategy when the firm issues bonds with
maturities between 0 and 2 year as well as T years to replace the maturing ones, holding the
amount of debt maturing each instant constant. Note that the slope between 0 and 2 years is
−ε.
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Figure 3.12 Endogenous Default Boundary VB as a function of liquidity cost k and the
proportion of short-term bonds issued ε.
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